Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Sir Jeffery McNeil-Lewis was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree battery, eight counts of terroristic threatening, and firearm enhancements, resulting in a life sentence plus fifteen years. The convictions stemmed from a shooting at an abandoned house in West Memphis, where McNeil-Lewis and an accomplice fired at Jarvis Moore and Stacy Abram. Moore died, and Abram survived, identifying McNeil-Lewis as a shooter. Additional evidence, including eyewitness testimony and gunshot residue, linked McNeil-Lewis to the crime.The Crittenden County Circuit Court denied McNeil-Lewis's petition for postconviction relief under Rule 37, which claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found that McNeil-Lewis failed to prove both deficient performance by his counsel and resulting prejudice. Specific claims included strategic decisions not to object to 911 calls on hearsay grounds, not to pursue self-defense, and not to object during sentencing. The court also found no prejudice from the failure to suppress evidence or from juror misconduct, as no actual bias was shown. Additionally, the court ruled that a Batson challenge would have been meritless and that not calling witnesses during sentencing was a strategic decision. Lastly, the court credited defense counsel's testimony that McNeil-Lewis was informed of and rejected a plea offer.The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, finding no clear error in its conclusions. The court held that McNeil-Lewis's arguments on appeal did not adequately address the circuit court's findings, particularly regarding strategic decisions and lack of prejudice. The court also upheld the circuit court's credibility determinations and strategic decisions made by defense counsel, concluding that McNeil-Lewis failed to meet the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. View "MCNEIL-LEWIS v. STATE OF ARKANSAS" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jon Comstock, a lawyer who was observing Rule 8.1 hearings in a Benton County jail courtroom. Comstock was seated behind a glass window where he could see but not hear the proceedings due to a malfunctioning or turned-off sound system. He attempted to make Judge Griffin aware of the violation of the constitutional guarantees of open court proceedings. During a break, Judge Griffin and Comstock had a heated exchange about Comstock's right to hear the proceedings, which resulted in Comstock being held in direct criminal contempt and sentenced to five days in Benton County Jail, with four and a half days suspended.Comstock filed an omnibus motion for a new trial, petition for review, and notice of appeal in the Benton County Circuit Court, arguing that the circuit court had jurisdiction to conduct a de novo trial of the contempt finding. The circuit court initially granted Comstock a new trial, but later ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to conduct a trial in the matter and dismissed the case, determining that the contempt order was a final order from a circuit court and that the appellate court was the proper venue for a review of that order.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the decision of the Benton County Circuit Court. It held that the contempt order was indeed a final order from a circuit court and that the appellate court was the proper venue for a review of that order. The court also found substantial evidence to support the circuit court’s order finding Comstock in direct criminal contempt. Therefore, the court affirmed the circuit court's finding and declined to reach Comstock’s recusal argument. View "Comstock v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of appellants who allegedly purchased luxury vehicles with funds provided by Dilmurod Akramov, the owner of CBC and D&O Group. The appellants would then transfer the vehicle titles back to Akramov's D&O Group without receiving cash or equivalent in exchange. They would then claim a "trade-in credit" against the sales tax due on the purchase of a vehicle. The Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (DFA) argued that these were not valid sales as required by Arkansas law and denied the sales-tax-refund claims.The appellants challenged the DFA's decision through the administrative review process, which affirmed the DFA's decision. The appellants then appealed to the Pulaski County Circuit Court for further review. The circuit court found that the appellants' attorney, Jason Stuart, was a necessary witness and therefore disqualified him from further representing the appellants. The court also held the appellants in contempt for failing to provide discovery per the court's order.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Stuart. The court applied the three-prong test from Weigel v. Farmers Ins. Co., which requires that the attorney's testimony is material to the determination of the issues being litigated, the evidence is unobtainable elsewhere, and the testimony is or may be prejudicial to the testifying attorney’s client. The court found that all three prongs were satisfied in this case. The court also affirmed the circuit court's decision to strike the third amended and supplemental complaint filed by Stuart after his disqualification. View "STUART v. WALTHER" on Justia Law

Fred and Sandra Monaco took legal action against the Faulkner County Assessor and the Faulkner County Tax Collector concerning the 2021 assessment of their property. Sandra Monaco had purchased a parcel of timberland in 2005 and later built a home on it. The property was assessed as agricultural without a building until 2020 when the Assessor's office discovered the improvement and reassessed the property's value. In July 2021, Sandra deeded the property to herself and her husband, Fred, and subsequently filed a form asserting a homestead right on the property and her right to an assessment freeze under amendment 79 of the Arkansas Constitution. Following the Board's upholding of the Assessor's valuation and assessment, Fred filed a petition for writ of mandamus in circuit court, which was denied.The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the circuit court's decision on several grounds. Firstly, Fred's attempt to represent Sandra's interests was deemed unauthorized practice of law, rendering the petition null with respect to Sandra's claims. Secondly, Fred could not claim a writ of mandamus as there were other remedies available to him such as appealing the Board's decision. The court found that a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy only issued to enforce an established right or the performance of a duty, and it requires the petitioner to show a clear and certain right to the relief sought and the absence of any other remedy. In this case, Fred failed to meet these requirements. View "MONACO v. LEWIS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Plaintiff's legal malpractice complaint against Defendants, her attorneys, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting Defendants' motions to dismiss and finding that Plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations on fraudulent concealment.Plaintiff retained Defendants to file negligence lawsuit. Defendants later informed Plaintiff they had committed malpractice by serving a deficient summons. Plaintiff subsequently filed a legal malpractice lawsuit alleging that Defendants fraudulently concealed their malpractice by keeping the appearance that Plaintiff's lawsuit was still alive. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to allege fraudulent concealment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) silence amounts to a positive act of fraud when there is a confidential or fiduciary relationship; and (2) Plaintiff's complaint pled sufficient facts to establish fraudulent concealment and survive a motion to dismiss. View "Nichols v. Swindoll" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court awarding attorneys' fees after a medical doctor sued and lost against a hospital following its revocation of the doctor's medical staff and surgical privileges, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion.Doctor, a surgeon, sued Hospital after his termination stemming from allegations that Doctor provided care that fell short of standard surgical practice. After a remand, all of Doctor's claims were dismissed. Thereafter, the circuit court awarded Hospital attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion for attorneys' fees was timely filed; and (2) Doctor was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Williams v. Baptist Health" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's legal malpractice complaint against Appellees, her attorneys, and finding that there were no facts in the complaint sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations based on fraudulent concealment, holding that there was no error.In the motion to dismiss, Appellees argued that Appellant's malpractice claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and should be dismissed. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case and finding there were no facts contained in the complaint sufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations based on fraudulent concealment. View "Nichols v. Gibson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court rescinded an earlier decision to answer a certified question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, holding that certification was improvidently granted.Plaintiff filed suit in the district court seeking to recover corrective fees it incurred in the underlying case. The district court concluded that Plaintiff could not establish proximate cause under Arkansas law and denied the motion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the district court certified a question of law regarding proximate cause in a legal malpractice action and corrective fees. The Supreme Court accepted the question of law. The Court then exercised its discretion to rescind its decision to answer the questioned question because the Eighth Circuit had already addressed the issue involved in the certified question presented to the Supreme Court. View "Gerber Products Co. v. Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, PLLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying relief in this Administrative Procedure Act (APA) appeal of the Colonel William J. Bryant's denial of Appellant's application to obtain a license for his private security and investigations company, holding that there was no error.Col. Bryant, in his capacity as director of the Arkansas State Police, entered an administrative order finding that Appellant was ineligible to receive a license due to his prior convictions. Appellant filed a petition for judicial review. After a remand, the circuit court denied the petition finding that there was substantial evidence to support the agency's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant cited no authority for the proposition that it was reversible error for the circuit court to decide an APA appeal on a different ground than that found by the administrative agency; and (2) the director did not err in determining that Ark. Code Ann. 17-40-306 controlled over Ark. Code Ann. 17-1-103. View "Hackie v. Bryant" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the petition brought by the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission claiming that Judge Carroll violated several rules of the Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct, including breaching his duty to the public and undermining the fair and impartial administration of justice, holding that disciplinary action was required.In its petition, the Commission agreed to recommend a suspension without pay for ninety days, with thirty days held in abeyance for one year, and certain remedial measures for Judge Carroll's improprieties. The Supreme Court granted the Commission's expedited petition and modified the recommendation sanction by suspending Judge Carroll without pay for eighteen months, with six of those months held in abeyance. The Court further ordered Judge Carroll to perform an assessment and complete a plan with the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program, holding that, given the seriousness of the conduct at issue, the length of the recommended suspension was insufficient. View "Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n v. Carroll" on Justia Law