Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The case involves a real estate dispute where plaintiffs, represented by Kenneth J. Catanzarite, alleged they were defrauded into exchanging their interests in an apartment complex for interests in a limited liability company. The dispute was ordered into arbitration at the plaintiffs' request, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of the defendant, Plantations at Haywood, LLC. Plantations then petitioned the court to confirm the arbitration award.The Superior Court of Orange County confirmed the arbitration award and granted Plantations' motion for sanctions against Catanzarite under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, imposing $37,000 in sanctions. The court found that Catanzarite's opposition to the petition was frivolous and factually unsupported. Catanzarite appealed the sanctions, arguing he was statutorily allowed to file an opposition and contest the arbitrator's award.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that Catanzarite's arguments were without merit and unsupported by existing law or any nonfrivolous extension of existing law. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's sanction award against Catanzarite. Additionally, the court granted Plantations' motion for sanctions on appeal, finding the appeal to be frivolous and without merit. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of sanctions to be awarded, with the option for Catanzarite to stipulate to the amount requested by Plantations. The order was affirmed, and Plantations was entitled to its costs on appeal. View "Plantations at Haywood 1, LLC v. Plantations at Haywood, LLC" on Justia Law

Frankie Greer filed a lawsuit against the County of San Diego under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming he suffered serious injuries while incarcerated in the San Diego Central Jail. During discovery, Greer requested documents from the County’s Critical Incident Review Board (CIRB) meetings related to in-custody deaths. The CIRB’s purpose is to consult with legal counsel on incidents that may lead to litigation, assess civil exposure, and recommend remedial actions. The district court ruled that the CIRB documents were not protected by attorney-client privilege, as the CIRB served multiple purposes beyond obtaining legal advice. After Greer settled his claims, several media organizations intervened to unseal the CIRB documents.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied the County’s motion for reconsideration and ordered the production of the CIRB documents, which were then produced under an attorneys’-eyes-only protective order. The district court also granted the media organizations' motion to intervene and unseal the documents, leading to the County’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the appeal was not moot, as effective relief could still be provided by ordering the return or destruction of the CIRB documents. The court determined that the attorney-client privilege applied to the CIRB documents, as the primary purpose of the CIRB meetings was to obtain legal advice regarding potential litigation and to avoid future liability. The court found that the district court had made significant legal errors in its determination and that the County had not waived the privilege. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to require the return and/or destruction of the privileged documents. View "GREER V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO" on Justia Law

In 2018, Joshua Chiazor Ezeka was convicted by a Hennepin County jury of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree attempted murder, and second-degree assault for killing Birdell Beeks while shooting at a rival gang member. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of release for the murder, and additional consecutive sentences for the other charges. On direct appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing on the attempted murder charge due to an excessive sentence.After resentencing, Ezeka filed a petition for postconviction relief in 2022, which the district court denied without an evidentiary hearing. The district court concluded that even if the facts alleged in the petition were proven, Ezeka was not entitled to relief. The court also found that most of his claims were procedurally barred as they were known or should have been known at the time of his direct appeal.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the new evidence presented by Ezeka, including reports of general discriminatory practices by the Minneapolis Police Department and the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, did not meet the legal standard for newly discovered evidence as it did not directly pertain to his case and would not have changed the trial's outcome. The court also found that the alleged failure to disclose this evidence did not constitute a Brady violation as it was not material to the case.Additionally, the court rejected Ezeka’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, concluding that his trial counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable and that there was no prejudice resulting from the alleged deficiencies. The court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in summarily denying the petition for postconviction relief. View "Ezeka vs. State of Minnesota" on Justia Law

Sealed Appellant 1, the former CEO of a publicly traded company, and Sealed Appellants 2 and 3, a lawyer and law firm that represented him and the company, appealed an order from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The district court compelled Sealed Appellants 2 and 3 to produce documents withheld under attorney-client privilege in response to grand jury subpoenas. The court found that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege applied, as there was probable cause to believe that communications between Sealed Appellants 1 and 2 were made to criminally circumvent the company’s internal controls.The district court concluded that the company had an internal control requiring its legal department to review all significant contracts. It found that Sealed Appellant 1 and Sealed Appellant 2 concealed settlement agreements with two former employees who had accused Sealed Appellant 1 of sexual misconduct. These agreements were not disclosed to the company’s legal department or auditors, violating internal controls and resulting in false statements to auditors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It first determined that it had jurisdiction under the Perlman exception, which allows for immediate appeal when privileged information is in the hands of a third party likely to disclose it rather than face contempt. On the merits, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the crime-fraud exception. It held that there was probable cause to believe that the communications were made to circumvent internal controls, thus facilitating or concealing criminal activity. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s order compelling the production of the documents. View "In Re: Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated September 13, 2023" on Justia Law

In 1992, six-year-old Angelo Garcia, Jr. was kidnapped and murdered after two masked intruders broke into the apartment of his parents, Arturo Rodriguez and Diana Garcia. Diana was sexually assaulted during the incident. The case went cold until 2007 when DNA evidence linked Obel Cruz-Garcia to the crime. Cruz-Garcia was convicted of capital murder in 2013 and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and his state habeas applications were denied.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied Cruz-Garcia’s federal habeas petition. Cruz-Garcia then sought a certificate of appealability (COA) from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, raising three issues: jurors’ use of the Bible during deliberations, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the exclusion of DNA evidence affecting his ability to present a complete defense.The Fifth Circuit denied the COA. The court found that the jurors’ reference to the Bible did not constitute an improper external influence, as it did not relate directly to the facts of the case. The court also determined that Cruz-Garcia’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims lacked merit, as his counsel’s performance was within the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Lastly, the court held that the trial court’s exclusion of certain DNA evidence did not violate Cruz-Garcia’s right to present a complete defense, as he was allowed to introduce other evidence regarding the DNA’s reliability.The Fifth Circuit concluded that Cruz-Garcia failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right and denied his motion for a COA. View "Cruz-Garcia v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person. The incident involved the shooting death of Barbara Williams in front of an apartment complex in Omaha, Nebraska. The shooter, identified by some witnesses as the defendant, arrived in a white sedan, fired multiple shots, and fled the scene. The defendant's primary defense was an alibi, claiming he was at a barbecue at the time of the shooting. Several witnesses and photographs supported this alibi, but the State argued he could have committed the crime and arrived at the barbecue shortly after.The trial court admitted cell phone data showing the defendant searched for news about the shooting shortly after it occurred. The defendant's motion to suppress this evidence was denied. On direct appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, finding the search warrant for the cell phone data was supported by probable cause and sufficiently particular.The defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on several grounds, including failure to object to the printouts of cell phone data, failure to adequately cross-examine witnesses, failure to challenge the investigation of an alternative suspect with dreadlocks, and failure to call a key alibi witness. The district court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing, reasoning that the defendant did not suffer prejudice from these alleged deficiencies.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the defendant's allegations, even if true, did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. The court noted that defense counsel had effectively cross-examined witnesses, challenged the State's evidence, and presented a cohesive alibi defense. The court also held that the failure to call the alibi witness, Richard, did not constitute ineffective assistance, as his testimony would not have significantly altered the evidentiary picture presented to the jury. View "State v. Goynes" on Justia Law

The plaintiff law firm sought to recover damages from the defendant, a former client, for breach of contract in federal court. The defendant had engaged the plaintiff to represent it in a litigation matter but failed to pay the agreed-upon legal fees. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's breach was wilful and malicious, and sought common-law punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut partially granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, awarding compensatory damages. However, the court found genuine issues of material fact regarding the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages and the defendant's counterclaims, including legal malpractice. The jury later found in favor of the plaintiff on all claims and counterclaims, determining that the defendant's breach was wilful and malicious. The District Court then certified a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding the recoverability of common-law punitive damages for wilful and malicious breach of contract.The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that a law firm may not recover common-law punitive damages for a client's breach of contract unless it pleads and proves the existence of an independent tort for which punitive damages are recoverable. The court noted that Connecticut appellate courts generally do not allow punitive damages for breach of contract claims, except in certain contexts like insurance and surety. The court emphasized the different purposes of compensatory damages in contract law and punitive damages in tort law, and declined to adopt a broader rule permitting punitive damages for wilful, malicious, or reckless breaches of contract. The court's decision aligns with the majority rule in other jurisdictions and the Restatements of Contracts and Torts. View "McCarter & English, LLP v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc." on Justia Law

Conduent State Healthcare, LLC (Conduent) was hired by the State of Texas to administer its Medicaid program. In 2012, Texas began investigating Conduent for allegedly helping orthodontics offices overbill for services. Texas sued several orthodontic providers in 2014, and the providers sued Conduent. Texas terminated its contract with Conduent and sued Conduent under the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act. Conduent was insured by AIG Specialty Insurance Company, ACE American Insurance Company, and Lexington Insurance Company, among others. The insurers provided defense coverage for the provider actions but denied coverage for the state action, claiming it involved fraudulent conduct excluded by the policies.The Superior Court of Delaware found that the insurers breached their duty to defend Conduent in the state action. The court also ruled that Conduent was relieved of its duties to cooperate and seek consent before settling with Texas due to the insurers' breach. The jury found that Conduent acted in bad faith and fraudulently arranged the settlement but did not collude with Texas or settle unreasonably. The Superior Court granted a new trial due to evidentiary issues and the jury's inconsistent verdicts.The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Superior Court's rulings. It held that the insurers' breach of their duty to defend excused Conduent from its duties to cooperate and seek consent. The court also ruled that the policy's fraud exclusion did not bar indemnity coverage because the settlement was allocated to breach of contract damages. The court found that the evidentiary issues and the jury's inconsistent verdicts justified a new trial to prevent manifest injustice. View "AIG Specialty Insurance Company v. Conduent State Healthcare, LLC" on Justia Law

Justo Malo Sanchez filed a legal malpractice complaint against Consumer Defense Law Group (CDLG), Tony Cara, Peter Nisson, and Nonprofit Alliance of Consumer Advocates (collectively Defendants). Sanchez alleged that the Defendants committed legal malpractice, resulting in the loss of his house. The retainer agreement he signed included an arbitration clause, which he argued was procedurally and substantively unconscionable due to his inability to understand English and his financial inability to afford arbitration fees.The Superior Court of Orange County initially tentatively denied the Defendants' motion to compel arbitration but later granted it. Sanchez then filed a petition for extraordinary relief, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and that he could not afford the arbitration fees.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found substantial procedural unconscionability due to the adhesive nature of the contract, Sanchez's limited English proficiency, and the lack of a Spanish translation or explanation of the arbitration clause. The court also found substantive unconscionability because Sanchez, who was indigent and had been granted a court fee waiver, could not afford the $2,000 arbitration filing fee and additional costs estimated between $25,000 and $30,000.The court concluded that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable due to unconscionability. Additionally, under the precedent set by Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine, the court held that Sanchez could be excused from paying the arbitration fees due to his inability to afford them. The court granted Sanchez's petition, directing the superior court to vacate its order compelling arbitration and to enter an order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Gregory Cohane filed a lawsuit against The Home Missioners of America, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Charlotte, and Al Behm, alleging child sexual abuse by Behm and negligence by the other defendants. Cohane claimed that Behm, a clergyman employed by Glenmary and supervised by the Diocese, groomed and sexually abused him over several years, starting when he was nine years old. Behm's abuse continued even after he was transferred to different locations due to other allegations of misconduct. Cohane's lawsuit was filed in 2021, invoking the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which allows previously time-barred claims of child sexual abuse to be brought within a specific two-year window.The Superior Court of Mecklenburg County dismissed Cohane's claims against Glenmary and the Diocese, ruling that the revival provision only applied to direct abusers, not to institutions that enabled the abuse. Cohane appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the plain language of the revival provision was broad enough to include claims against both direct abusers and enablers.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the revival provision of the SAFE Child Act, which revives any civil action for child sexual abuse otherwise time-barred under N.C.G.S. § 1-52, applies to claims against both direct abusers and those who enabled the abuse. The court emphasized that the plain language of the statute did not distinguish between different types of defendants and that traditional tort principles allow for recovery from both direct tortfeasors and those who contributed to the harm. Thus, Cohane's claims against Glenmary and the Diocese were revived under the SAFE Child Act. View "Cohane v. The Home Missioners of America" on Justia Law