Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

A plaintiff, seeking to secure retirement funds, sold an apartment complex in 2017 and was introduced to Ronald Hill, who represented himself as a financial advisor but was only licensed as an insurance producer. Hill persuaded the plaintiff to invest the sale proceeds in a product offered by Future Income Payments, LLC (FIP), and also to purchase an Indexed Universal Life (IUL) insurance policy, initially from Minnesota Life and later from Pacific Life. Hill proposed that the proceeds from the FIP investment would fund the premiums for the Pacific Life IUL policy. FIP was subsequently exposed as a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the plaintiff’s loss of the investment and inability to pay the insurance premiums.The plaintiff and other parties filed suit in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho, asserting claims including negligence against Hill and Pacific Life. By trial, only Hill and Pacific Life remained as defendants, with the plaintiff as the sole remaining claimant. The trial proceeded on a common law negligence claim. The jury found both Hill and Pacific Life negligent, determined Hill was acting as Pacific Life’s agent, and apportioned 60% of fault to Pacific Life and 40% to Hill. The district court entered judgments against Pacific Life, including joint and several liability with Hill for a portion of damages. Pacific Life appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of motions for directed verdict.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the appeal and held that, under Idaho law, Pacific Life owed no duty to protect the plaintiff from pure economic loss absent an applicable exception to the economic loss rule. The Court further found insufficient evidence to establish Hill acted as Pacific Life’s agent when marketing the FIP investment. The Court vacated the judgments against Pacific Life and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Pacific Life. View "Shelstad v. Pacific Life Insurance" on Justia Law

Gregory Engellant, after suffering a traumatic brain injury, was placed under guardianship, with his brother Ken acting as guardian and conservator. In 2012, Greg engaged attorney Dan McLean of Crowley Fleck, PLLP to update his estate plan, expressing a wish to gift his shares in Engellant Ranch Corporation to his niece, Shana Diekhans, who had been operating the ranch. Greg executed a new will in 2012 reflecting this intent and transferred his shares to Shana, valued at about $1.7 million. In 2015, Greg signed several documents prepared by Daren Engellant, purporting to revoke the 2012 will, but the circumstances surrounding these documents were contested, as Greg signed multiple versions without noticing changes. Greg died in 2019, and Daren, as personal representative, petitioned to probate the 1978 will, which devised Greg’s estate equally to Daren, Kevin, and Shana.In the District Court of the First Judicial District, Daren sued Crowley Fleck for malpractice, alleging the firm failed to adequately investigate Greg’s capacity and Ken’s conduct before facilitating the stock transfer. Crowley Fleck joined Ken and Shana as third-party defendants. During trial, Shana learned Daren had withheld information about the 2015 revocation documents and sought to admit the 2012 will to probate. The District Court allowed evidence on the validity of the 2012 will, and the jury found it was Greg’s last valid will, meaning the estate suffered no damages from Crowley Fleck’s actions. The court entered judgment for Crowley Fleck and denied Kevin Engellant’s post-trial motion to intervene as untimely.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Court held that evidence regarding the 2012 will’s validity was relevant to causation and damages in the malpractice claim, that Crowley Fleck’s defense was properly pleaded, and that the jury could determine the validity of the 2012 will for the purposes of the malpractice case. The Court also upheld the exclusion of settlement agreement evidence and the denial of Kevin’s intervention. View "Engellant v. Crowley Fleck" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a company and a port authority over responsibility for securing permits to dredge a ship channel in Lake Charles, Louisiana. The company had leased the channel to develop a grain terminal, but the lease did not specify which party was responsible for obtaining the dredging permit. After the terminal was built but could not be fully used without dredging, the company and the port disagreed over who bore this responsibility. The company sued in federal court, and, by consent of both parties, a U.S. Magistrate Judge presided over a bench trial and awarded the company nearly $125 million.After the trial and the entry of judgment, the port discovered that the magistrate judge and the company’s lead trial counsel had been close family friends for four decades—a relationship that was not fully disclosed. The only disclosure had been that the lead counsel’s daughter was the judge’s law clerk, who would be screened from the case. Upon learning about the undisclosed relationship, the port moved to vacate the magistrate judge referral. The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held an evidentiary hearing and found that the port’s consent to the referral had not been knowing, as it had lacked crucial information about the judge’s conflict, and vacated the referral.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The Fifth Circuit held that a party’s consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction waives a fundamental constitutional right and, therefore, must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court rejected the argument that constructive knowledge by the party’s counsel—rather than actual knowledge—could suffice to establish valid consent. Because the district court applied the correct standard and found no actual knowledge, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the vacation of the referral. View "I F G Port v. Lake Charles Harbor" on Justia Law

Nancy Martin embezzled millions of dollars from her employers over several years. After discovery of her actions, her employers obtained an $11 million default judgment against her in Kansas state court when she failed to appear, apparently following the advice of her attorney. Subsequently, Martin was federally indicted for bank fraud and for assisting in the filing of false tax documents, related to her failure to report the embezzled funds. On the advice of counsel, she pled guilty to one count of bank fraud and one count of tax fraud. The federal district court sentenced her to concurrent prison terms and ordered $3.9 million in restitution.Martin initially appealed her conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, but her appeal was dismissed due to the appeal waiver in her plea agreement. She then filed a motion in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. She claimed her attorney failed to inform her of potential defenses related to the bank fraud charge and the necessity of willfulness for the tax charge. The district court denied her motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, finding her legal theories insufficient and concluding she had not demonstrated prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial de novo and held that Martin was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether her counsel’s failure to advise her of a potential defense to bank fraud constituted deficient performance, and whether she suffered prejudice as a result. Additionally, the court found that the district court erred in its legal analysis regarding willfulness for the tax charge and remanded for further proceedings to properly assess prejudice. The district court’s denial was therefore reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

The case arose from a single incident in which the petitioner forcibly took a 2000 BMW from its owner at gunpoint during a high-speed chase through Idaho County. He was charged with multiple offenses, including grand theft of an automobile and armed robbery, both relating to the same act of taking the BMW. The petitioner pleaded guilty to several charges pursuant to a plea agreement, and the district court sentenced him to consecutive terms, including for both grand theft and armed robbery.After his conviction was affirmed by the Idaho Court of Appeals on direct appeal (where he did not raise a double jeopardy argument), the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief in the District Court of the Second Judicial District. He argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a double jeopardy objection to being convicted and sentenced for both offenses stemming from the same conduct. The district court summarily dismissed his petition, concluding that the double jeopardy claim was both procedurally barred and, on the merits, that grand theft was not a lesser included offense of armed robbery under either the Blockburger test or Idaho’s pleading theory. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and held that, under the Idaho Constitution’s double jeopardy provision and Idaho’s pleading theory, grand theft as charged was a lesser included offense of the armed robbery charge because both counts were based on the same act of taking the same car from the same victim. The Court clarified that the pleading theory, not the strict elements (Blockburger) test, governs such double jeopardy claims under Idaho law. As a result, the Court vacated the judgment, reversed the district court’s order granting summary disposition, and remanded the case for further proceedings, concluding that the petitioner established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Sedillo v. State" on Justia Law

An attorney licensed in Utah challenged the state’s requirement that lawyers join the Utah State Bar and pay annual dues as a condition of practicing law. She argued that the Bar engaged in activities—such as lobbying, publishing a journal, and posting on social media—that were not sufficiently related to regulating the legal profession or improving legal services. She also objected to the procedures used by the Bar for handling members’ mandatory dues, claiming they were inadequate to protect her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the District of Utah first dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that mandatory dues violated her rights, relying on precedent from the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Schell v. Chief Justice & Justices of Oklahoma Supreme Court. The district court then reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment on the remaining claims. It ruled for the defendants, finding that most challenged Bar activities were germane under the standard set in Keller v. State Bar of California, and that the Bar’s procedures for handling objections to expenditures and providing refunds were constitutionally sufficient.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that, under existing Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, mandatory bar dues are constitutional when used for activities germane to regulating the legal profession or improving legal services. The court also held that the correct legal standard for evaluating the Bar’s activities is the “germaneness” test from Keller, not a heightened “exacting scrutiny” standard. Because the plaintiff did not adequately challenge the district court’s germaneness findings or show that the Bar’s procedures were constitutionally deficient, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal and summary judgment rulings. View "Pomeroy v. Utah State Bar" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an individual designer, developed a spill-proof cup lid and sought to have it manufactured and sold. She contacted a company for manufacturing and, during this process, shared confidential materials with a sales representative who was also representing the manufacturer in the same product category. Later, she discovered that the manufacturer had released a product almost identical to her design and had obtained both a design and a utility patent for it. The plaintiff then engaged a law firm and attorney to pursue potential legal claims and settlement discussions with the manufacturer’s parent company. During the representation, the attorney was negotiating employment with the law firm representing the opposing party, a fact not initially disclosed to the plaintiff. Eventually, the law firm terminated its representation of the plaintiff, citing unpaid fees.After the termination, the plaintiff, acting without legal counsel, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the law firm and the attorney, asserting multiple claims including legal malpractice, fraud, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, emphasizing the plaintiff’s failure to adequately allege harm causally connected to the defendants’ conduct, particularly any lost viable legal claim or damages resulting from the alleged conflict of interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that, under Ohio law (as specified in the retainer agreement), the plaintiff did not sufficiently plead that the attorney’s conduct caused her to lose any viable underlying legal claim due to the expiration of a statute of limitations. The court also found the plaintiff’s alternative theories of harm, including loss of the retainer fee and emotional distress, insufficient to sustain a malpractice claim. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Sima v Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff LLP" on Justia Law

Two activists participated in demonstrations outside the Israeli embassy in Washington, D.C., protesting Israel's military actions in Gaza. Over several months, three incidents occurred involving Rabbi Herzfeld, a local rabbi and community leader, and the activists. During these incidents, the activists alleged that Rabbi Herzfeld and his companions made provocative and upsetting remarks, engaged in intimidating behavior, and, in one instance, initiated a federal lawsuit and media coverage that the activists felt endangered them. The activists felt harassed and took steps to increase their personal security after these events.Following the third incident, the activists filed petitions for anti-stalking orders in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that Rabbi Herzfeld’s conduct constituted stalking under D.C. law. Rabbi Herzfeld moved to dismiss the petitions, arguing that his actions were protected by the First Amendment and did not meet the statutory definition of stalking, citing precedent from Mashaud v. Boone. The trial court held a summary trial and ultimately denied the petitions, finding that the conduct did not amount to threats or surveillance within the meaning of the statute and was constitutionally protected speech. Rabbi Herzfeld later sought attorney’s fees under the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act and, alternatively, for alleged bad faith.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It affirmed the denial of the anti-stalking petitions, holding that Rabbi Herzfeld’s conduct did not constitute “true threats” and was protected political speech, not actionable as stalking. The court vacated the award of attorney’s fees, finding the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard under the Anti-SLAPP Act and had not given proper notice for a bad-faith fee award. The matter was remanded for further proceedings regarding attorney’s fees. View "Rokhvand & Barmada v. Herzfeld" on Justia Law

Three commissioners of the Port of Benton—Scott Keller, William O’Neil, and Lori Stevens—were the subject of recall petitions filed by Benton County voters. The petitions alleged thirteen counts of misconduct for each commissioner, largely focusing on actions attributed to Keller, some of which occurred before he was elected commissioner. The essential allegations that occurred during their terms as commissioners were that the three retaliated against the Port’s executive director, Diahann Howard, by suspending her after she raised complaints leading to an investigation of Keller, and that they retaliated against the Port’s finance director, Alicia Myers, by terminating her after she released the investigation report. Additionally, Keller alone was accused of failing to disclose his ownership interest in an LLC with a lease from the Port, as required by state law.A Benton County Superior Court judge reviewed the recall petitions, dismissing most of the thirteen charges against each commissioner as legally or factually insufficient. However, the court found two charges—retaliation against Howard and Myers—factually and legally sufficient against all three commissioners, and found the failure to disclose financial information charge factually and legally sufficient against Keller alone. The recall proponents did not appeal the dismissal of other charges, and the commissioners appealed the sufficiency findings to the Washington Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the trial court’s rulings in all respects. The court held that the charges of retaliation for whistleblowing and failure to disclose material financial interests stated factually and legally sufficient grounds for recall under the Washington Constitution and statutes. Specifically, the court found that actual or threatened retaliation constitutes misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office, and that intentional nondisclosure of required financial information by an elected official is legally sufficient to support recall. The court’s disposition allows these charges to proceed to the voters. View "In re Recall of O'Neil" on Justia Law

A patient sought treatment for back pain at a hospital and subsequently left partially paralyzed. He retained an attorney on a contingency fee basis to pursue claims for medical malpractice. The agreement set attorney fees at varying percentages, depending on when the case was resolved. The attorney then brought in a second law firm as co-counsel under a similar agreement. During the course of litigation, the patient’s attorneys amended the complaint to add an ordinary negligence claim alongside the professional negligence claims. The case settled for a confidential amount. After settlement, the attorneys claimed that the ordinary negligence claim removed the settlement from Nevada’s statutory cap on attorney fees in medical professional negligence cases, and they sought to collect higher fees under their agreements. The client disputed this, asserting that the statutory cap should apply.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County ruled in favor of the attorneys, finding that the ordinary negligence claim was not subject to the statutory cap on attorney fees and that the attorneys were entitled to the full contingency fee amounts. The court also found that the attorneys had properly perfected their attorney liens on the settlement proceeds, even though notice of the liens was sent after receipt of the first settlement check.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that, under the recent decision in Limprasert v. PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas LLC, the substance of the patient’s ordinary negligence claim sounded in professional negligence, so the statutory cap on attorney fees applied. The Supreme Court further held that attorney liens must be perfected (by notice to the client) before the attorney receives settlement funds, so only the lien on the second settlement check was validly perfected. The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "CASTILLO VS. ATKINSON WATKINS & HOFFMANN, LLP" on Justia Law