Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company (Philadelphia), a Pennsylvania-based insurer, brought claims of malpractice, indemnity, and contribution against Martin O’Leary, Kimberly Forrester, and the Sedgwick LLP Liquidating Trust (Sedgwick Defendants). The Sedgwick Defendants, former employees of the now-bankrupt Sedgwick LLP, had provided legal services to Philadelphia. The claims arose from a Montana class action lawsuit involving Gateway Hospitality, Inc. (Gateway), which Philadelphia had insured. Sedgwick advised Philadelphia to deny coverage to Gateway, leading to a settlement where Gateway paid approximately four million dollars to class members.The Fourth Judicial District Court in Missoula County granted the Sedgwick Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. The court found that Philadelphia failed to establish that the Sedgwick Defendants had sufficient contacts with Montana to warrant jurisdiction. Philadelphia appealed this decision, arguing that the Sedgwick Defendants' actions related to the Montana lawsuit should subject them to Montana's jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the Sedgwick Defendants did not have sufficient contacts with Montana to establish personal jurisdiction. The Sedgwick Defendants' actions, including providing legal advice and sending a denial letter from California to Ohio, did not constitute transacting business or committing a tort in Montana. The court concluded that the Sedgwick Defendants' conduct did not create a substantial connection with Montana, and thus, the exercise of personal jurisdiction was not appropriate. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v O'Leary" on Justia Law

An attorney, Brian Steel, was found in contempt of court for refusing to disclose how he learned about an ex parte hearing involving a witness, the witness's counsel, and prosecutors in a case where Steel represented a defendant. The trial judge, Judge Glanville, repeatedly asked Steel to reveal his source, but Steel claimed the information was protected by attorney-client privilege and attorney work product. Judge Glanville held Steel in contempt and ordered him into custody, although Steel was later allowed to return to the courtroom.The Fulton County Superior Court initially found Steel in contempt and ordered him to be taken into custody. Steel argued that the information was privileged and that due process required Judge Glanville to recuse himself from the contempt proceedings. Despite these arguments, Judge Glanville sentenced Steel to 20 days in jail to be served on weekends and denied him a supersedeas bond.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that due process required Judge Glanville to recuse himself from the contempt proceedings. The court held that because the punishment was delayed and the alleged disobedience was directed toward the judge, a different judge should have presided over the contempt hearing. The court reversed the judgment of contempt imposed by the trial court. View "STEEL v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, who operate restaurants under franchise agreements, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition based on advice from their legal counsel. This led to the franchisor terminating the franchise agreements. The plaintiffs then sued their lawyers and law firms for legal malpractice and breach of written contracts for legal services, alleging that the lawyers' advice constituted malpractice. The defendants moved to dismiss both claims, arguing they were barred by a four-year statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-25.The trial court dismissed the legal-malpractice claims but denied the motion to dismiss the breach-of-contract claims. Later, it granted summary judgment for a subset of defendants, ruling that the breach-of-contract claims were also barred by the four-year statute of limitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the legal-malpractice claims and concluded that the breach-of-contract claims were duplicative and should be dismissed as well.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine which statute of limitation applies to breach-of-contract-for-legal-services claims and whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing these claims as duplicative. The Supreme Court concluded that such claims could be governed by either a six-year statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-24 or a four-year statute under OCGA § 9-3-25, depending on whether the breach arose directly from a written contract. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the breach-of-contract claims as duplicative without applying the proper motion-to-dismiss standard.The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, emphasizing that plaintiffs can pursue alternative theories of relief based on the same conduct. View "TITSHAW v. GEER" on Justia Law

Louis Mercado was charged with three counts of capital sexual battery in Florida. During his trial, the court granted judgments of acquittal on two counts and declared a mistrial on the third count due to prosecutorial error. The trial court then barred a retrial, citing the Double Jeopardy Clause. The State appealed this decision, but Mercado's attorney, mistakenly believing he had withdrawn from the case, failed to file a response brief. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, leading to Mercado's retrial, conviction, and life sentence.The Fifth District Court of Appeal summarily denied Mercado's state habeas petition, in which he argued ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to file a response brief. Mercado contended that this failure should be presumed prejudicial under United States v. Cronic, rather than requiring proof of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. The appellate court's decision was based on the reasoning that the failure to file a brief did not constitute a complete denial of counsel.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Mercado's federal habeas petition. The court held that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has never applied the Cronic presumption of prejudice to a situation where counsel failed to file an appellee's brief. Therefore, the state court's requirement for Mercado to prove actual prejudice under Strickland was deemed reasonable. View "Mercado v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In 2010, the defendant was prosecuted for multiple counts of attempted murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and other charges. He pleaded no contest to one count of attempted murder and admitted to several enhancements, resulting in a 30-year prison sentence. In 2022, he filed a petition to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the trial court found made a prima facie case for an evidentiary hearing. The defendant then sought discovery of peace officer personnel records, which the trial court partially granted after an in-camera review.The Monterey County Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition. The defendant appealed, requesting the appellate court to review the trial court's application of Pitchess standards to the discovery motion. The appellate court requested supplemental briefing on whether the trial court's review should also encompass Brady principles, which require the disclosure of exculpatory evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, determined that a petitioner may obtain disclosure of peace officer personnel information under Brady principles through Pitchess procedures in advance of a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court did not clearly consider Brady principles when ruling on the discovery motion. Consequently, the appellate court conditionally reversed the trial court's order denying the petition and remanded the case for further proceedings to ensure compliance with Brady requirements. If the trial court finds additional discoverable information, it must allow the defendant to demonstrate prejudice and potentially order a new evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Nuno" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants marketed fraudulent franchise opportunities to foreign nationals seeking to invest in the United States to obtain residency visas. The complaint included claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state-law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and malpractice. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants misrepresented the nature of the investment opportunities, leading the plaintiffs to believe they were purchasing franchises that would qualify them for E-2 or EB-5 visas. Instead, they received licenses that did not meet visa requirements, resulting in financial losses and visa application issues.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The court found that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege a cognizable enterprise under RICO and failed to meet the heightened pleading standards for fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The district court also denied the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, citing undue delay and the plaintiffs' failure to provide a proposed amended complaint or additional facts that would cure the deficiencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to plead a RICO enterprise, as the complaint did not provide sufficient factual detail to support the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise. The court also upheld the dismissal of the fraud and fraudulent inducement claims, finding that the plaintiffs did not meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b). Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint and the dismissal of claims against certain defendants for failure to effect timely service of process. View "Crosswell v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In 2009, a surgeon performed a shoulder replacement surgery on a patient, during which the patient suffered a fracture and subsequent nerve injury, resulting in permanent radial nerve palsy. The patient sued the surgeon and associated medical entities for professional negligence, claiming vicarious liability. The case went to trial twice; the first trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants, but the court granted a new trial due to juror misconduct. The second trial resulted in a verdict for the patient, awarding significant damages, which the court reduced according to statutory caps.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County oversaw the trials. After the second trial, the court reduced the pain and suffering damages to $350,000 pursuant to NRS 41A.035, awarded attorney fees, and capped expert witness costs. The defendants moved for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct, which the court denied. Both parties appealed various aspects of the court's decisions, including the application of the damages cap, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and the award of attorney fees and costs.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a res ipsa loquitur instruction despite expert testimony, as the relevant statutory amendments did not apply retroactively. The court affirmed the reduction of pain and suffering damages to $350,000, applying the statutory cap to both the surgeon and the medical entities. The court also upheld the denial of a new trial based on juror misconduct, finding no intentional concealment or prejudice.Regarding attorney fees, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's award but modified it to comply with NRS 7.095, capping the total recoverable amount. The court found no conflict between NRCP 68 and NRS 18.005 but remanded the case for further proceedings on expert witness fees, requiring a more detailed application of the Frazier factors. The judgment and order denying a new trial were affirmed, the attorney fees award was affirmed as modified, and the order retaxing costs was reversed in part. View "NEVINS VS. MARTYN" on Justia Law

Thomas Eugene Creech, who has been on death row for over four decades for the 1981 murder of fellow inmate David Dale Jensen, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. Creech alleged that the Ada County Prosecutor’s Office introduced fabricated or misleading evidence at his clemency hearing. He sought to recuse U.S. District Judge Amanda K. Brailsford from presiding over his underlying § 1983 suit, arguing that Judge Brailsford and Ada County Prosecutor Jan Bennetts are close friends, which could affect the judge's impartiality.The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho denied Creech’s motion to preliminarily enjoin his execution, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Creech continued to litigate his § 1983 claim, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. He then moved to disqualify Judge Brailsford, citing her friendship with Bennetts. Judge Brailsford denied the recusal motion, stating that although she and Bennetts were close during their clerkship, they had since lost touch and a reasonable person would not question her impartiality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Creech’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court found that the longstanding friendship between Judge Brailsford and Bennetts, combined with the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct involving Bennetts, could lead a reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality. The court emphasized that public confidence in the judiciary requires that any appearance of bias be addressed promptly. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded the case for reassignment to a different judge. View "Creech v. United States District Court for the District of Idaho, Boise" on Justia Law

Andy Espinosa pleaded guilty to the malice murder of Zachary Mejia and other related offenses. Espinosa was living with his girlfriend and her four children, including Zachary. On December 8, 2020, Espinosa and Zachary had a physical altercation, which left Espinosa feeling humiliated. The next day, Espinosa searched online about what it feels like to murder someone. Later that day, he returned home, grabbed a knife, and fatally stabbed Zachary. Espinosa called 9-1-1 and was arrested. He later claimed he was overtaken by a "demon" during the stabbing.Espinosa was indicted by a Chattooga County grand jury and pleaded guilty to all counts without a sentencing recommendation from the State. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole for malice murder, a consecutive five-year term for possession of a knife during the commission of a felony, and a concurrent 12-month term for cruelty to children in the third degree. Espinosa filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not advising him of an insanity defense.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Espinosa claimed his plea counsel was ineffective for not investigating his mental state and advising him of a potential insanity defense. Plea counsel testified that he did not see a viable defense and believed a plea was in Espinosa's best interest. The court found that counsel's performance was not deficient, as his strategic decisions were based on his professional judgment and experience. The court also noted that Espinosa did not provide evidence of past mental health issues or expert testimony supporting an insanity defense.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Espinosa's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court held that Espinosa failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. View "Espinosa v. State" on Justia Law

Michael Earl Summerville was convicted of felony murder in connection with the death of Martha West. On December 10, 2017, Summerville and West, who were romantic partners, visited their neighbor Johnny Clark. After an argument, Summerville returned to Clark’s home later that night, reporting that West had fallen in a nearby field. West was found deceased in the field, with evidence suggesting she had been struck by a vehicle. Summerville’s truck showed signs of a collision, and fibers consistent with West’s clothing were found on the truck. An autopsy revealed extensive injuries consistent with being struck by a motor vehicle.A Wilkes County grand jury indicted Summerville for malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, and aggravated assault, family violence. He was found not guilty of malice murder but guilty of the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison for felony murder, with the aggravated assault charge merging for sentencing purposes. Summerville’s motion for a new trial was denied, and he appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Summerville’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and trial court error. Summerville argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to a comment in the State’s closing argument and that the trial court improperly limited cross-examination of a witness. The court held that the prosecutor’s comment during closing arguments was a permissible inference from the evidence, and thus, any objection would have been meritless. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in limiting the cross-examination of the medical examiner, as Summerville failed to show that the examiner’s prior disciplinary action was probative of potential bias. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Summerville v. State" on Justia Law