Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries
Elizalde Castillo v Blanche
A Mexican national and her two sons entered the United States without proper documentation after receiving threatening phone calls in their home country. The threats, directed to her and her sister, referenced the family’s remittances from the United States and implied a risk of kidnapping or harm to the children. The family did not report these threats to Mexican authorities and relocated within Mexico temporarily before seeking asylum at the U.S. border in 2014. Removal proceedings were initiated because they lacked valid entry documents.During the immigration proceedings, the Immigration Judge (IJ) found the mother credible but denied asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ determined that the threatening calls did not constitute persecution, that her proposed social group was not cognizable, and that there was no evidence the harm was based on a protected ground. The IJ also found the Mexican government was not shown to be unable or unwilling to protect her, and she failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision without opinion in March 2025, making that decision final. The mother then filed a motion to reconsider and reopen, which the BIA denied, finding no error of law or fact and concluding she had not established a prima facie case for relief or a material change in country conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed only the BIA’s November 2025 denial of the motions to reconsider and reopen. The court held that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions, as the petitioner failed to identify any error of law or fact and did not present new evidence that would change the outcome. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied. The court also ordered counsel to show cause regarding potential misuse of generative artificial intelligence in the submitted briefs. View "Elizalde Castillo v Blanche" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Hilgers v. Herman
A criminal case was initiated in Sarpy County, Nebraska, against an individual accused of first degree sexual assault of a child. At the preliminary hearing in county court, a deputy county attorney prosecuted the case, and the judge found probable cause to bind it over to district court. Defense counsel did not raise any issues about ex parte communications or conflicts of interest at this stage. After the case moved to district court, a different deputy county attorney was assigned, and the original prosecutor was no longer involved. Defense counsel later alleged, for the first time in district court, that the deputy county attorney had engaged in improper ex parte communications with the county court judge during the preliminary hearing. She sought to call the deputy county attorney as a witness, but ultimately did not do so.The district court, on its own initiative, considered these allegations and the purported appearance of impropriety, and appointed a special prosecutor from the Attorney General’s office, disqualifying the Sarpy County Attorney’s office from further participation. The Sarpy County Attorney’s office objected, arguing there was no evidence supporting a conflict of interest or improper conduct. The court denied motions to reconsider, and the defense never presented evidence of misconduct or called the deputy county attorney to testify. The district court eventually found the motion to quash the subpoena moot.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court's actions in an original quo warranto proceeding brought by the Attorney General and Sarpy County Attorney. The Court held that the district court abused its discretion in appointing a special prosecutor because no evidence was presented supporting a disqualifying conflict of interest under the relevant statute. The appearance of impropriety alone was insufficient, and the conflict was not shown to affect the entire county attorney’s office. The Court ordered judgment of ouster, reinstating the Sarpy County Attorney’s office to the prosecution and removing the Attorney General’s office as special prosecutor. View "State ex rel. Hilgers v. Herman" on Justia Law
Jacobson v. First Community Credit Union
A trustee filed a lawsuit against a credit union, claiming that the credit union failed to accept negotiable instruments totaling $8,500,000, refused to open a trust account, and did not provide a written explanation for its refusal. The trustee sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, on behalf of the trust. The trustee, who is not an attorney, filed complaints with similar allegations and included documents characteristic of the sovereign citizen movement.The District Court of McIntosh County, Southeast Judicial District, presided by Judge Daniel D. Narum, reviewed the case. The court determined that the trustee was not a licensed attorney and therefore could not represent the trust or its beneficiaries in legal proceedings. Despite this, the court considered the merits of the claims and found that the credit union was not obligated to accept the instruments, which were not legal tender. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice.On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the trustee, as a non-attorney, was not authorized to provide legal representation for the trust beneficiaries. The court held that all filings made by the trustee, including the notice of appeal, were void due to the unauthorized practice of law. It further determined that the lawsuit was void from inception and that dismissal should have been without prejudice, as there was no adjudication on the merits. The Supreme Court imposed sanctions against the trustee individually for pervasive inaccuracies and frivolous arguments, awarded attorney’s fees and double costs to the credit union, denied all motions filed by the trustee as void, and dismissed the appeal. View "Jacobson v. First Community Credit Union" on Justia Law
Nexsen, PC v. Cadence Bank
Cadence Bank hired a law firm in October 2020 to provide legal services related to an $8 million loan to a holding company, with the loan closing in November 2020. The collateral for the loan included assets of a subsidiary insurer, which operated in Louisiana. Following severe hurricane damage in August 2021, the Louisiana Insurance Commissioner (LIC) moved to place the insurer into receivership, contesting the validity and priority of Cadence’s security interest in the insurer’s assets due to a lack of required regulatory approval for the loan. By March 2022, Cadence was aware of the LIC’s position disputing the validity of its security interest.The Jefferson Circuit Court denied the law firm’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in Cadence's legal-malpractice lawsuit, which alleged the firm should have advised Cadence to seek regulatory approval for the loan and later added a claim of fraudulent suppression regarding the attorneys’ expertise. The trial court certified questions regarding whether Cadence’s claims were time-barred under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act (ALSLA), and whether any tolling or ameliorative provision would save the claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that, under the plain language of the ALSLA, the statute of limitations for a legal-malpractice claim begins to run when the act or omission giving rise to the claim occurs—the “occurrence” rule—rather than when the client suffers actual damage. The Court found that the relevant act or omission occurred no later than the November 2020 loan closing, and Cadence’s knowledge of the facts within the two-year limitations period barred application of any six-month ameliorative period. The Court also found Cadence’s fraud-based claim insufficiently pleaded to invoke tolling under § 6-2-3. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s judgment and directed it to enter judgment for the defendant law firm. View "Nexsen, PC v. Cadence Bank" on Justia Law
Wasserman v. Beggs
The plaintiff, acting as executor of a probate estate, brought suit against a law firm and its principal, alleging negligent misrepresentations related to their representation in a probate matter. After initially naming multiple defendants and amending her complaint several times, only the law firm and its principal remained as defendants in this appeal. During the proceedings, the plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint that included unsanctioned pro se coplaintiffs and was found by the court to be unnecessarily lengthy and filled with irrelevant allegations. The court struck this complaint and offered the plaintiff options: to dismiss with prejudice, to file a more detailed motion explaining the absence of legal prejudice to the defendants if dismissed without prejudice, or to file a compliant Third Amended Complaint. Instead, the plaintiff filed a notice seeking voluntary dismissal without prejudice, but failed to provide the required explanation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio determined that, since the defendants had already answered, the dismissal had to proceed under Rule 41(a)(2), which requires a court order and can be with prejudice if warranted. The court found that the plaintiff failed to address its directive and, given her history of frivolous filings and sanctions in other cases, dismissed the action with prejudice. Additionally, the court designated the plaintiff as a vexatious litigator and imposed prefiling restrictions, requiring attorney certification or prior court review for any new cases.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s actions for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court properly dismissed the action with prejudice, complied with due process in imposing vexatious litigator restrictions, correctly declined to recuse, and found no merit in the claim of failure to report elder abuse. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order in all respects. View "Wasserman v. Beggs" on Justia Law
MILLERS LANE CENTER, LLC V. MORGAN & POTTINGER, P.S.C.
A Florida limited liability company owned commercial property in Louisville and was advised by its attorneys to lock out a tenant for unpaid rent and sell the tenant’s property to satisfy a lien. The tenant subsequently sued for conversion and other claims, resulting in a multimillion-dollar judgment against the company and its principals. During the litigation, a second, similarly named Kentucky LLC was formed, but it was never made a defendant in the original suit. While appeals were pending, the Kentucky LLC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and a settlement agreement was reached, contingent upon approval by the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court confirmed a plan that substantively consolidated the two LLCs for purposes of the bankruptcy, after which the property was sold to satisfy creditors.In the Jefferson Circuit Court, the Kentucky LLC brought malpractice claims against the attorneys, alleging negligent advice and mishandling of the defense. The Florida LLC and its principal later filed similar claims. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding the Kentucky LLC was not the client and had no claim, and that the Florida LLC had surrendered its claim through bankruptcy proceedings. The Kentucky Court of Appeals agreed the Kentucky LLC could not maintain the claim, but held the Florida LLC retained the claim since assignment was prohibited; however, it found the claims time-barred because the statute of limitations began at settlement execution.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the dismissal of all claims. It held that the Kentucky LLC was not owed a client-based duty and did not own the malpractice claim. The court determined that the statute of limitations for malpractice began when the bankruptcy court’s confirmation order made the settlement binding, not at the earlier settlement execution. Because the operative complaint was filed more than a year after this accrual date, all claims were time-barred. The cross-appeals were dismissed as moot. View "MILLERS LANE CENTER, LLC V. MORGAN & POTTINGER, P.S.C." on Justia Law
OMS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company
A pharmacy, operated by a licensed pharmacist, improperly compounded a prescription medication for a patient after a technician mistakenly entered a formula with the wrong dosage. The patient consumed the medication, suffered severe poisoning, required intensive medical treatment, and subsequently filed suit against the pharmacy and the pharmacist. She alleged negligence, wantonness, product liability, breach of the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and failure to warn. The pharmacy’s liability insurer, Nationwide, declined coverage, citing a professional-services exclusion in its policy. The pharmacy had previously been covered by a different insurer, Zurich, whose policy did not exclude such claims.After the patient obtained a substantial judgment against the pharmacy, a separate action was brought to determine whether the Nationwide policy covered the claim and whether the insurance agents who procured the policy for the pharmacy had been negligent or wanton in failing to secure proper coverage. The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court entered summary judgment for Nationwide, finding the professional-services exclusion applied, and for the insurance agents, concluding the pharmacy was contributorily negligent for not reading its policy.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that the professional-services exclusion in the Nationwide policy unambiguously barred coverage for all claims, including product-liability claims, arising from the compounding of medication, which is a professional service under Alabama law. The Supreme Court also held that the pharmacy was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to read its insurance policy, which expressly excluded the type of coverage in question, thereby precluding any claim for negligent failure to procure insurance. The summary judgments in favor of Nationwide and the agency defendants were affirmed. View "OMS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law
Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment
Two plaintiffs brought suit against a prominent music record label and several executives, alleging sexual battery, harassment, assault, and unpaid wages. One plaintiff claimed that while performing services for the label, she was sexually battered and harassed by executives and not paid for her work. The other plaintiff alleged assault and harassment by an employee while residing in a label-owned home to support an artist. The lawsuit was initially filed under pseudonyms, but the plaintiffs did not seek court approval to proceed anonymously.After the lawsuit was filed, plaintiffs’ counsel issued a press release using the pseudonyms to publicize the allegations. The defendants then issued their own press release, which publicly disclosed the plaintiffs’ real names. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim for doxing under Civil Code section 1708.89, asserting that the disclosure of their names constituted doxing. Defendants responded with a special motion to strike this cause of action under California's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing the press release was protected activity. Plaintiffs conceded the activity was protected but argued they could show a probability of prevailing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the anti-SLAPP motion, reasoning that the disclosure was not necessary and referencing the Rules of Professional Conduct to find potential prejudice to judicial proceedings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two reviewed the denial. The court held that the defendants' press release was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the disclosure of plaintiffs’ names was protected by the fair report privilege, since plaintiffs had not sought court authorization to proceed anonymously. The court reversed the trial court’s order, directed it to grant the anti-SLAPP motion, and strike the doxing cause of action. Defendants were awarded costs on appeal. View "Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment" on Justia Law
Bombardini v. Board of Psychology
A licensed psychologist faced disciplinary action after being convicted in 2018 of insurance fraud related to a workers’ compensation claim. The Board of Psychology issued an accusation in 2019 based on the conviction and also alleged dishonesty in her 2007 license application for failing to disclose a 1984 conviction. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing in 2020, the Board found cause to discipline her solely for the insurance fraud conviction, dismissed the charge related to the 1984 conviction, and placed her on probation for five years with various conditions, holding the probation in abeyance during periods when she was not practicing in California.After moving out of state and returning, the psychologist petitioned the Board in 2023 for early termination of her probation. The Board held an evidentiary hearing in 2024, found she failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation—citing her lack of insight and responsibility for the insurance fraud conviction—and denied the petition. The Board noted her probation had been tolled due to her absence and non-practice. She then sought judicial review of both the 2021 probation decision and the 2024 denial of early termination in the Superior Court of Sacramento County.The Superior Court denied her petition, finding the challenge to the 2021 decision untimely and concluding the 2024 denial was supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Court held that the trial court properly applied the substantial evidence test to review the Board’s denial of early termination, as this was analogous to review of an agency’s decision on reinstatement rather than discipline. The Court found the Board did not abuse its discretion and rejected arguments regarding procedural unfairness and relevance of the 1984 conviction. The judgment was affirmed. View "Bombardini v. Board of Psychology" on Justia Law
Shannon v. Shannon
The parties in this case are former spouses who have been engaged in litigation over their divorce for several years. After the Sarpy County District Court entered a divorce decree in 2023, including a parenting plan, the party awarded sole physical custody sought enforcement of several provisions, alleging that the other party had failed to pay a court-ordered equalization payment, attorney fees, and his share of medical expenses for their children. She also alleged violations of the parenting plan, such as improper transportation arrangements, preventing communication with children, failure to administer medication, unauthorized travel, and exceeding allotted parenting time. The other party claimed inability to pay, disputed some allegations, and asserted misunderstandings regarding the parenting plan.The Sarpy County District Court held an evidentiary hearing, found the party in violation of its orders, and determined his testimony was not credible, particularly regarding his financial situation and explanations for his conduct. As a result, the court found him in willful contempt, ordered a 90-day incarceration which could be avoided by compliance ("purge" conditions), temporarily reduced his summer parenting time, and awarded attorney fees to the opposing party. The party appealed, but his brief contained numerous fictitious case citations and misstatements of law, leading the Nebraska Supreme Court to strike the brief and review only for plain error.The Nebraska Supreme Court found no plain error in the district court’s findings or sanctions. It clarified that self-represented litigants must adhere to the same standards as attorneys and that submission of briefs with fabricated citations is sanctionable. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s contempt order, the imposition of attorney fees, denial of in forma pauperis status, and the other sanctions. The district court’s order was affirmed. View "Shannon v. Shannon" on Justia Law