Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

In this case, the appellant, Christopher Lynn Johnson, was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses for the shooting death of Officer David Grove, a Deputy Wildlife Conservation Officer. On the night of November 11, 2010, Officer Grove encountered Johnson and his friend Ryan Laumann spotlighting deer near Gettysburg National Military Park. After stopping Johnson's vehicle, a confrontation ensued, during which Johnson shot Officer Grove multiple times, resulting in his death. Johnson fled the scene but was apprehended the following morning.The Court of Common Pleas of Adams County denied Johnson's petition for relief from his death sentence under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA). Johnson raised multiple claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, Brady violations, and improper victim impact evidence. The PCRA court held a five-day evidentiary hearing and ultimately found no merit in Johnson's claims. The court determined that Johnson failed to demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's actions and that there was no evidence of an agreement between the Commonwealth and Laumann regarding his testimony.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the PCRA court's decision. The court found that Johnson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lacked merit, as his counsel conducted a thorough investigation and presented a robust mitigation defense during the penalty phase. The court also concluded that Johnson failed to prove any Brady or Napue violations, as there was no agreement between the Commonwealth and Laumann. Additionally, the court held that the victim impact evidence presented was permissible and did not violate Johnson's constitutional rights. Finally, the court determined that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors did not warrant relief. View "Commonwealth v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A creditor and a debtor’s law firm both claimed settlement funds held by the superior court. The creditor had a charging order against the debtor’s distributions from a limited liability company (LLC), while the law firm had an attorney’s lien on the funds. In a previous appeal, the attorney’s lien was deemed valid, but the case was remanded to determine if the funds were LLC distributions subject to the charging order and the value of the attorney’s lien.The superior court ruled that the funds were LLC distributions and subject to the charging order. It also found that the debtor failed to prove any money was owed to the law firm for work performed, thus invalidating the attorney’s lien. The court mistakenly released the funds to the creditor, who returned them within two days, but was sanctioned with attorney’s fees for temporarily keeping the funds.The debtor appealed, and the creditor cross-appealed the attorney’s fee award. The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s rulings on the merits but reversed the attorney’s fee award. The court held that the funds were indeed LLC distributions subject to the charging order and that the debtor and law firm failed to prove the value of the attorney’s lien. The court also vacated the second final judgment and the attorney’s fee award against the creditor, finding no rule violation by the creditor. View "Baker v. Duffus" on Justia Law

Marietta Area Healthcare, Inc., Marietta Memorial Hospital, and Marietta Healthcare Physicians, Inc. (collectively "Marietta") filed a lawsuit against Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital Corporation, Camden-Clark Health Services, Inc., West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc., and West Virginia United Health System, Inc. (collectively "Camden-Clark"). Marietta alleged that Camden-Clark attempted to economically disadvantage them by causing its agents and employees to initiate and pursue a spurious qui tam action against Marietta. The claims included malicious prosecution, tortious interference, abuse of process, fraudulent legal process, civil conspiracy, negligent supervision, aiding and abetting tortious conduct, and vicarious liability.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia reviewed the case and denied Camden-Clark's motion to dismiss seven of the eight claims. However, the court deferred ruling on the negligent supervision claim, noting that the law regarding negligent supervision in West Virginia was unsettled. The district court then certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia regarding the viability and elements of a negligent supervision claim and whether intentional or reckless torts by an employee could form the basis for such a claim.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that a claim for negligent supervision is viable under West Virginia common law. The court clarified that the elements of a negligent supervision claim include the traditional elements of negligence—duty, breach, causation, and damages—along with the necessity of demonstrating a tortious act or omission by the employee. The court further held that an employer could be liable for negligent supervision regardless of whether the employee's conduct was negligent, reckless, or intentional, provided the elements of the claim are met. View "Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Marietta Area Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Steven Kellam was convicted in the Superior Court of Delaware for racketeering, two counts of first-degree felony murder, and other crimes, resulting in two life sentences plus 770 years in prison. Kellam sought postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, arguing that his convictions were unjust. The Superior Court rejected all but one of his claims, agreeing that the felony-murder jury instruction misstated the law, leading to the vacatur of his felony-murder convictions and life sentences.Kellam appealed the Superior Court's rejection of two grounds for postconviction relief. He argued that the amendment of his indictment was so substantive that it resulted in his conviction for racketeering without proper indictment, undermining the court's jurisdiction. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for his trial lawyer's failure to request a jury instruction on accomplice liability.The Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the case. It found that Kellam's challenge to the indictment amendment was procedurally barred because he did not object during the trial and failed to show cause and prejudice. The court also determined that the alleged defect in the indictment was curable and did not divest the Superior Court of jurisdiction.Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court concluded that Kellam's trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to request a Section 274 instruction, as it would not have benefited Kellam and could have undermined the defense's credibility.The State cross-appealed, arguing that the Superior Court erred in vacating Kellam's felony-murder convictions due to the flawed jury instruction. The Delaware Supreme Court agreed, distinguishing this case from Ray v. State, and found that the faulty instruction did not prejudice Kellam's defense. The court reversed the Superior Court's vacatur of Kellam's felony-murder convictions and remanded for reinstatement of those convictions and sentences. View "Kellam v. State" on Justia Law

Antonio Ingram pleaded guilty to five felony counts, including armed robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery, on September 30, 2016. The court found his plea was freely and voluntarily entered and entered a judgment of conviction on March 3, 2017, nunc pro tunc to September 30, 2016. Ingram was sentenced to concurrent 20-year prison terms, with 15 years to serve for each conviction. Ingram retained attorney David Jones to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was timely filed on October 27, 2016. However, there is no evidence that the trial court ruled on the motion, and Jones testified that the motion was dismissed without a hearing on March 3, 2017.The Superior Court of Richmond County granted in part Ingram’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, allowing him to pursue an out-of-time direct appeal. The court found that Jones rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to inform Ingram of his right to appeal the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Ingram cross-appealed, arguing that the habeas court erred in denying him the remedy of setting aside his guilty plea and judgment of conviction.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the habeas court erred in treating the March 3 "Order to Enter Sentence" as an order denying Ingram’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The record did not demonstrate that Ingram’s judgment of conviction was final for purposes of habeas review. The court vacated the habeas court’s order and remanded the case with directions to allow the parties to supplement the record and demonstrate whether Ingram’s judgment of conviction is final. If the motion to withdraw the guilty plea remains pending, the habeas petition should be dismissed as premature. If the judgment is final, the habeas court may reenter its previous order with that determination. The cross-appeal claims were deemed moot. View "JOSEPH v. INGRAM" on Justia Law

Jaquan Dontae Weston was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of his father, Leroy Weston. The crimes occurred between March 5-6, 2018. A Terrell County grand jury indicted Weston in June 2018, and he was found guilty on all counts in an October 2019 jury trial. Weston was sentenced to life in prison without parole for malice murder, five years consecutive for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and twelve months concurrent for cruelty to children in the third degree. Weston filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. His appeal was initially stricken due to his appellate counsel's failure to file a brief, but it was later re-docketed after new counsel was appointed.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Weston argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his malice murder conviction and claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court found that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, showed that Weston formed the intent and malice necessary for a malice murder conviction. The jury was entitled to find Weston guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on his actions and statements following his daughter's outcry about her grandfather.Weston also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his competency to stand trial, request a competency hearing, and object to certain evidence. However, these claims were not preserved for appellate review as they were not raised in his motion for a new trial. The court also found that Weston failed to show that his trial counsel was ineffective for not obtaining an expert evaluation of his sanity at the time of the crimes, as there was no evidence presented to support this claim.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no merit in Weston's arguments. View "WESTON v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jacqueline Statham suffered injuries during a hysterectomy performed by Dr. David S. Quang, assisted by Dr. Tan-Loc Nguyen and a medical student. The medical student, under the supervision of the defendant physicians, improperly inserted a sponge stick into Statham's rectum instead of her vagina, leading to a rectovaginal fistula. Statham sued the physicians and their medical practice, alleging professional negligence, negligent supervision, and vicarious liability for the medical student's actions.The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, ruling they could not be held vicariously liable for the medical student's negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with the lead opinion concluding that OCGA § 51-1-38 did not impose vicarious liability on the physicians and that the evidence did not support vicarious liability under general agency principles or the borrowed servant doctrine.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that OCGA § 51-1-38 did not provide a basis for vicarious liability. The court also agreed that the borrowed servant doctrine did not apply as an independent basis for imposing vicarious liability. However, the court disagreed with the conclusion that the defendant physicians could not be held vicariously liable under general agency principles. The court held that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a physician can be vicariously liable for a medical student's negligence if the student was acting as the physician's servant in furtherance of the physician's goals and within the scope of the physician's business.The Supreme Court found that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the defendant physicians were vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Therefore, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the defendants on the issue of vicarious liability. View "STATHAM v. QUANG" on Justia Law

Cynthia Cox-Ott sued attorney Jim Leonard and his firm Barnes & Thornburg, LLP, for professional negligence, alleging that Leonard’s actions led to the unfavorable disposition of her case involving a dispute with an insurer over a life insurance policy premium. Leonard had recommended filing suit in Georgia rather than New York and pursuing claims for fraud and reformation of the policy. The insurer removed the case to federal court, which dismissed it, and the dismissal was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Leonard and his firm, finding that they were protected by the doctrine of judgmental immunity, which shields attorneys from liability for decisions made in the honest exercise of professional judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision on the same basis, concluding that Leonard’s recommendations were protected by judgmental immunity and that Cox-Ott could not establish the causation element of her professional negligence claims.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine whether the doctrine of judgmental immunity correctly states the law of Georgia regarding professional negligence claims against attorneys. The court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis by focusing solely on whether Leonard engaged in an honest exercise of professional judgment, rather than whether he exercised reasonable care in reaching that judgment. The Supreme Court disapproved the portions of the Court of Appeals’ decision relying on judgmental immunity but ultimately affirmed the judgment on the grounds that Cox-Ott failed to establish causation, an independent basis for the Court of Appeals’ decision. View "COX-OTT v. BARNES & THORNBURG, LLP" on Justia Law

Two Texas lawyers, Michael A. Pohl and Robert Ammons, represented out-of-state clients in personal injury cases filed outside Texas. The clients, from Louisiana and Arkansas, alleged that they were solicited by individuals on behalf of the lawyers, which led to the signing of legal-services contracts. The clients later sued the lawyers in Texas, seeking to void the contracts under Texas Government Code Section 82.0651(a), which allows clients to void contracts procured through barratry, and to recover fees and penalties.The trial court dismissed all claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the lawyers. The clients appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that Section 82.0651(a) applied because part of the lawyers' conduct occurred in Texas. The court also rejected the lawyers' arguments regarding limitations and res judicata and allowed Reese's intervention in the case.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that Section 82.0651(a) does not extend to the nonresident clients' claims because the core conduct targeted by the statute—solicitation of a legal-services contract through barratry—occurred outside Texas. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment to the extent it allowed the clients to proceed with their claims under Section 82.0651(a) and rendered judgment that they take nothing on those claims. However, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment regarding the breach of fiduciary duty claims and remanded those claims to the trial court for further proceedings. View "POHL v. CHEATHAM" on Justia Law

Debra Tucker applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act in 2018. After multiple denials at the administrative level, she appealed to the federal district court. In 2023, the district court reversed the final administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, remanding Tucker’s claim for further administrative proceedings. The district court awarded Tucker’s attorney $7,500 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), along with $402 in costs. Tucker’s attorney had a contingency-fee agreement for twenty-five percent of any past-due benefits awarded. In August 2024, an administrative law judge found Tucker disabled and granted her monthly disability benefits retroactive to February 2018, totaling $124,821.70 in past-due benefits.The district court granted in part and denied in part the attorney’s motion for $31,205.43 in fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), awarding $17,400 instead. The court found the requested fee excessive, amounting to a windfall, and set an imputed hourly rate of $500. The attorney’s motion for reconsideration, reducing the fee request to $22,620, was denied. The attorney appealed, seeking the full $31,205.43.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court found that the district court properly started with the contingency-fee agreement and then tested it for reasonableness, considering the effective hourly rate and other factors. The district court did not misapply the law by comparing the effective hourly rate to the EAJA rate and the attorney’s ordinary rate. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that it acted within its discretion in reducing the fee to avoid a windfall. View "Tucker v. Commissioner of Social Security" on Justia Law