Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

The case involves a long-running dispute between two parties, Baer and Tedder, stemming from Baer's lawsuit against Tedder for malicious prosecution. During the course of this litigation, Baer filed a motion to compel production of documents and requested sanctions against Tedder and his counsel, Kent, for misuse of the discovery process. The trial court found that Tedder and Kent had engaged in evasive and unjustified conduct during discovery, which hindered Baer's ability to prepare his case. As a result, the court imposed $10,475 in monetary sanctions against both Tedder and Kent, jointly and severally.Tedder and Kent appealed the sanctions order to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three. In a prior opinion, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s sanctions order, finding that Tedder and Kent’s actions were not substantially justified and that their arguments on appeal were largely frivolous. Following the remittitur, Baer moved in the trial court to recover attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal, arguing that the relevant discovery statutes authorized such an award. The trial court agreed, awarding Baer $113,532.50 in appellate attorney’s fees, but imposed liability only on Tedder.On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030(a) and 2031.320(b) authorize a trial court to award attorney’s fees incurred on appeal to a party who successfully defends an order imposing monetary sanctions for discovery misuse. The appellate court found the amount of fees reasonable with one reduction and concluded that both Tedder and Kent should be held jointly and severally liable for the full amount. The order was modified to reduce the fee award to $101,805 and to impose joint and several liability on both Tedder and Kent, and as modified, the order was affirmed and remanded for entry of the revised order. View "Baer v. Tedder" on Justia Law

A county attorney in Nebraska sought to challenge the appointment of a special prosecutor in a juvenile court case. The issue arose because the county attorney’s adult daughter, who works as a caseworker for the Department of Health and Human Services, was assigned to the same juvenile case and could potentially be called as a witness. The daughter testified that she did not discuss her work with her father and that her father’s position would not affect her testimony. The deputy county attorney assigned to the case also testified to his independence in handling the matter.The Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster County, on its own initiative, raised concerns about a possible conflict of interest due to the familial relationship. The court found that the lack of disclosure of the relationship, combined with the organizational structure of the county attorney’s office, created a conflict of interest. Relying on Nebraska ethics advisory opinions and a prior appellate decision, the court concluded that the entire county attorney’s office should be disqualified and appointed a special prosecutor under Nebraska Revised Statute § 23-1205.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the matter as an original action in quo warranto. The court held that the existence of a conflict of interest must be determined on a case-by-case basis and is personal to the attorney involved. It found no evidence that the county attorney’s professional judgment or the deputy county attorney’s independence was compromised by the daughter’s involvement. The court concluded that the appointment of a special prosecutor was unwarranted under the facts presented and ordered the ouster of the special prosecutor, reinstating the county attorney’s office to the case. View "State ex rel. Condon v. Braaten" on Justia Law

A law firm sought defense and indemnification from its professional liability insurer after being sued in New York state court by a judgment creditor of its client. The creditor alleged that the firm facilitated the sale of the client’s diamond ring and received a portion of the proceeds to satisfy past fees and as a retainer for future services, despite a restraining notice prohibiting the client from transferring assets due to an unpaid judgment. The state court complaint accused the firm of fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with judgment collection, and contempt of court.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed the law firm’s claims for defense and indemnification and denied its motion for partial summary judgment regarding the insurer’s duty to defend. The district court found that the policy’s misappropriation exclusion applied, concluding that the firm’s handling of the sale proceeds was unauthorized in light of the restraining notice, regardless of the client’s consent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. Applying New York law, the Second Circuit held that the allegations in the underlying complaint involved the provision of professional services by the law firm and did not constitute “misappropriation” as commonly understood, since there was no allegation that the firm acted without its client’s authorization. The court found the term “misappropriation” ambiguous and construed it in favor of the insured. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal, reversed the denial of partial summary judgment on the duty to defend, and remanded with instructions to enter partial summary judgment for the law firm on the insurer’s duty to defend. The court did not address other policy exclusions or the insurer’s ultimate duty to indemnify. View "Marcus & Cinelli, LLP v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Centripetal Networks LLC owns a patent related to rule-based network threat detection for encrypted communications. In November 2021, Palo Alto Networks petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of certain claims of Centripetal’s patent. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) instituted the IPR with a panel of three administrative patent judges (APJs). Subsequently, Cisco Systems and Keysight Technologies filed similar petitions and sought to join the proceedings. During the process, Centripetal discovered that one APJ, McNamara, owned Cisco stock and moved for the recusal of the panel and vacatur of the institution decision, arguing a conflict of interest. After rehearing requests and additional disclosures, APJ McNamara and another APJ withdrew from the panel, but the Board denied Centripetal’s recusal motion as untimely and found no violation of ethics rules or due process.The PTAB, in its final written decision, held claims 1, 24, and 25 of Centripetal’s patent unpatentable as obvious. Centripetal appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, challenging both the merits of the Board’s obviousness determination and the handling of the recusal issue. The Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s recusal analysis for abuse of discretion and its legal conclusions de novo, finding that Centripetal’s recusal motion was untimely and that the APJ’s stock ownership did not violate applicable ethics regulations. The court also determined that Centripetal’s due process rights were not infringed and that the Board’s actions did not warrant vacatur based on recusal concerns.However, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB failed to adequately consider evidence of copying presented by Centripetal as part of the obviousness analysis. The court vacated the Board’s final written decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Board to properly address the evidence of copying. The disposition by the Federal Circuit was “vacated and remanded.” View "CENTRIPETAL NETWORKS, LLC v. PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC. " on Justia Law

A Black man was charged with multiple offenses, including felony false imprisonment, after a domestic violence incident in which his girlfriend alleged he struck her and prevented her from leaving his car. Witnesses observed the girlfriend attempting to exit the moving vehicle and heard shouting. The girlfriend initially told police that the defendant hit her and threatened her if she tried to leave, but later recanted, claiming she fabricated the story out of anger. The prosecution introduced both her initial statements and her recantation at trial. The jury found the defendant guilty of felony false imprisonment and other related charges, but acquitted him of attempted robbery. He admitted a prior conviction, and the trial court imposed a total sentence of nine years and four months, including time for an unrelated prior case.During trial, the defendant’s counsel raised concerns under the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) regarding the racial composition of the jury venire and the prosecution’s peremptory challenge of a Black prospective juror. The Santa Clara County Superior Court denied these motions, finding no evidence of bias or violation of the RJA. At sentencing, the court made comments referencing the defendant’s race and background, but defense counsel did not object to these statements under the RJA.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the defendant forfeited his RJA claims on appeal by failing to object to the trial court’s statements at the appropriate time. The court also found no merit in the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, as there was a conceivable tactical reason for not objecting. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on misdemeanor false imprisonment, as there was no substantial evidence to support that lesser offense. The judgment of conviction and sentence was affirmed. View "People v. Wagstaff" on Justia Law

An attorney who represented a client in a high-profile employment discrimination case against Louisiana State University (LSU) officials later brought suit against two attorneys and their law firm who had served as outside counsel to LSU. The plaintiff alleged that these attorneys engaged in misconduct during a Title IX investigation and, during subsequent state court litigation, made defamatory statements about him, including accusations of fabricating evidence. The state court had previously imposed significant monetary sanctions against the plaintiff and his client, citing, among other things, the plaintiff’s alleged fabrication of evidence and abusive litigation tactics.After the state court proceedings, the plaintiff filed a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, asserting claims for defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy under Louisiana law. The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice. It found the defamation claim barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, which limits federal review of state court judgments, and determined that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was inadequately pleaded. The court also dismissed the conspiracy claim for lack of an underlying tort and denied leave to amend the complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine did not bar the defamation claim because the plaintiff’s alleged injury arose from the defendants’ conduct, not from the state court judgment itself. The court vacated the dismissal of the defamation and conspiracy claims and remanded for further proceedings. However, it affirmed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, finding the alleged conduct did not meet the required legal standard. The court also vacated the denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "English v. Crochet" on Justia Law

Giovanni De Meo, a co-founder of ReTech Labs, Inc., was involved in two business transactions in 2017 and 2021 concerning Rebotics, LLC, a company in which he held a minority interest. Cooley LLP served as outside counsel for ReTech and later for Rebotics, but De Meo was never a direct client of Cooley. In both transactions, Cooley prepared documents at the direction of its client, but did not communicate or negotiate directly with De Meo regarding the terms. During the 2021 transaction, De Meo retained his own counsel and negotiated separately with the buyer, Symphony AI, ultimately securing more favorable terms for himself without Cooley’s involvement.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment in favor of Cooley LLP, finding no attorney-client relationship between De Meo and Cooley during either transaction. The court determined that Cooley had complied with its professional obligations, including those under California State Bar Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(f), and that De Meo’s claims of breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent concealment were unsupported by the facts. The court also excluded certain evidence submitted by De Meo, including portions of his declaration and an expert’s declaration, on evidentiary grounds.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that no express or implied attorney-client relationship existed between De Meo and Cooley, and that the Rules of Professional Conduct do not create a fiduciary duty to nonclients actionable in tort. The court also found that De Meo’s fraudulent concealment theory was not properly pled and could not be considered. The judgment in favor of Cooley LLP was affirmed. View "De Meo v. Cooley LLP" on Justia Law

A staff member at a university medical school morgue, Cedric Lodge, engaged in a scheme over several years in which he dissected, stole, and sold body parts from cadavers that had been donated for research and education. After Lodge’s federal indictment became public, forty-seven relatives of individuals whose remains were potentially mishandled sued the university, the managing director of the anatomical gift program (Cicchetti), and the program manager (Fay). The plaintiffs alleged that the university and its staff failed to ensure the dignified treatment and disposition of donated remains, pointing to inadequate security and oversight, and referenced a similar prior scandal at another institution.The cases were consolidated in the Massachusetts Superior Court, where the defendants moved to dismiss all claims, arguing they were protected by the “good faith” immunity provision of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA). The Superior Court judge granted the motion, finding that the complaints did not plausibly suggest the defendants failed to act in good faith or were legally responsible for Lodge’s actions.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case after transferring it from the Appeals Court. The court held that the UAGA’s good faith immunity applies to the entire anatomical donation process, including the final disposition of remains. The court further held that the plaintiffs’ allegations against the university and Cicchetti, if true, could support a finding of “peculiarly pervasive noncompliance” with the act, sufficient to infer a lack of good faith and defeat the motion to dismiss at this stage. However, the court found the allegations against Fay insufficient to overcome the good faith defense. The court reversed the dismissal as to the university and Cicchetti (except for respondeat superior claims), affirmed dismissal as to Fay, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Weiss v. President and Fellows of Harvard College" on Justia Law

A man with severe chronic pain had long been prescribed oxycodone. When he visited his doctor for an unrelated issue, he was also prescribed clonazepam, a benzodiazepine. The combination of these two drugs carries a significant risk of respiratory depression and death, a fact underscored by an FDA-mandated black box warning. The man and his wife expressed concern about the new prescription, but his doctor reassured them. When the prescription for clonazepam was filled at a pharmacy, the pharmacist’s computer system flagged a warning about the dangerous interaction with oxycodone. The pharmacist overrode the warning and dispensed the medication. The man died the next day from toxicity due to both drugs.The man’s family and estate sued the pharmacy, alleging negligence, including a failure to warn about the drug interaction. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, denied the pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment, which was based on the “learned intermediary rule.” This rule generally exempts pharmacists from warning patients about the general risks of FDA-approved drugs, on the assumption that the prescribing physician is best positioned to provide such warnings. The district court found that there were material factual disputes about whether the pharmacist knew of a patient-specific risk and whether the learned intermediary rule applied.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on interlocutory appeal. It held that the learned intermediary rule does not shield a pharmacist from liability when the pharmacist is aware of a patient-specific risk, as opposed to general risks associated with a drug. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, clarifying that pharmacists retain a duty to act as a reasonably prudent pharmacist would when aware of such risks. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Walgreen v. Jensen" on Justia Law

Attorney Alan Maestas was found guilty of direct punitive contempt for refusing to proceed to trial despite the district court’s orders and warnings. As a sanction, the district court imposed a ten-day jail sentence, suspended in full, and ordered Maestas to pay a $1,000 fine to the New Mexico State Bar Foundation. The contempt finding and sanction arose from Maestas’s conduct in the presence of the court, which the court determined warranted punitive measures.The New Mexico Court of Appeals reviewed the district court’s contempt finding and affirmed it, but found that the initial sanction imposed was an abuse of discretion. On remand, the district court imposed the revised sanction described above. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals certified to the Supreme Court of New Mexico the question of whether a contempt fine ordered payable to a third party is permitted by statute and the New Mexico Constitution.The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that a fine payable to a third party is permitted under the judiciary’s inherent and broad contempt power and is constitutional. The Court clarified that only fees collected by the judicial department, not fines merely imposed, are subject to the limitations of Article VI, Section 30 of the New Mexico Constitution. The Court distinguished between “fees” and “fines,” finding that the constitutional provision applies only to fees collected, not to punitive contempt fines directed to third parties. The Court also found no relevant legislative constraint on the type of fine imposed in this case. The matter was remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of other issues raised on appeal. View "State v. Maestas" on Justia Law