Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

Vernon K. Smith, Jr. was declared a vexatious litigant by the Fourth District Administrative District Judge (ADJ) in Idaho. This order prevents Smith from filing new litigation pro se in Idaho courts without obtaining prior permission from a judge. The determination arose from Smith's conduct in litigation concerning the administration of his mother Victoria H. Smith’s estate. Smith, a former attorney, was involved in contentious probate proceedings after his brother successfully challenged their mother's will, which had left the entire estate to Smith. The estate was subsequently administered as intestate, leading to multiple appeals and disciplinary actions against Smith by the Idaho State Bar.The district court found that Smith repeatedly filed frivolous and unmeritorious motions, including petitions to remove the personal representative (PR) and the PR’s counsel, motions to disqualify the district court judge, and objections to court orders. These actions were deemed to lack legal or factual basis and were intended to cause unnecessary delay. The PR of the estate moved to have Smith declared a vexatious litigant under Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59(d)(3), which the district court supported, leading to the referral to the ADJ.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the ADJ’s decision. The court held that the ADJ did not abuse its discretion in declaring Smith a vexatious litigant. The ADJ acted within the legal standards set forth in Rule 59(d) and reached its decision through an exercise of reason. The court also found that Smith’s due process argument was not preserved for appeal as it was raised for the first time. The court declined to award attorney fees to the ADJ, concluding that Smith’s appeal, although unsuccessful, was not frivolous or unreasonable. View "Smith v. Hippler" on Justia Law

On the evening of May 2, 2021, and into the early hours of May 3, 2021, an incident occurred at the home of Judy Foster involving her adoptive son, Donald Edward Foster, and M.W., an 18-year-old acquaintance. Foster, armed with a knife and later a handgun, threatened both women, restrained and bound them, and moved them to the basement. He isolated Judy in a bathroom and then committed multiple distinct acts of sexual assault against M.W., including oral, anal, and attempted vaginal penetration, each separated by time, location, and intervening events. After several hours, M.W. convinced Foster to leave the house, and he was apprehended by law enforcement.The State charged Foster with multiple counts, including aggravated sexual intercourse without consent, attempted sexual intercourse without consent, and aggravated kidnapping. During jury selection, the State disclosed newly discovered evidence from Foster’s cellmate, leading to an in-chambers discussion from which Foster was absent due to safety concerns. Foster’s counsel moved for a continuance, which the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, granted. Foster later ratified this decision. At trial, the State did not use the cellmate’s evidence, and the jury convicted Foster on all counts.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed Foster’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, statutory violations regarding multiple charges from the same transaction, and due process violations for his absence from a critical stage. The court held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to multiple charges, as each offense was based on distinct acts. The court also found that Foster’s absence from the in-chambers discussion was harmless error, as he was promptly informed and ratified the decision, and the evidence in question was not used at trial. The court affirmed Foster’s convictions. View "State v. Foster" on Justia Law

In a personal injury case, the plaintiff, Jerry Cradduck, sued Hilton Domestic Operating Company, Inc. for negligence related to an incident at a spa in 2019. During the trial, Cradduck's attorney, Todd Samuels, failed to appear due to a medical emergency, leading to a series of events that included a mistrial and ultimately the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court dismissed the case primarily because Samuels did not provide timely evidence of his medical condition and continued to work on other cases shortly after claiming he was too ill to speak.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially granted an eight-day continuance after Samuels' medical emergency but later dismissed the case when neither Cradduck nor Samuels appeared as ordered. Samuels' failure to provide adequate medical evidence and his continued legal work in other cases led the court to question the legitimacy of his claims. The court also found Samuels' conduct sufficiently egregious to warrant a referral to the State Bar of California.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, agreeing that the trial court had acted within its discretion based on the evidence and circumstances presented. The appellate court also referred attorney Narine Mkrtchyan to the State Bar for her uncivil and disrespectful conduct during the proceedings. The judgment was affirmed, and the defendants were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Cradduck v. Hilton Domestic Operating Co." on Justia Law

John Padgett was convicted of malice murder for the strangling death of his former girlfriend, Wynesha Medley. Medley ended their relationship in November 2016, after which Padgett sent her aggressive messages and visited her apartment uninvited. On January 23, 2017, Medley reported to the police that she believed Padgett had turned off her power. The next day, Medley was found dead in her apartment with a pair of leggings around her neck. Forensic evidence linked Padgett to the crime scene, including his DNA under Medley’s fingernails and cell phone location data placing him near her apartment at relevant times.A Chatham County grand jury indicted Padgett for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. In May 2021, a jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole. Padgett filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied after a hearing in September 2024. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Padgett’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Padgett argued that his trial counsel failed to emphasize certain DNA evidence, investigate and present evidence about another potential suspect, and object to the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments. The court found that the decisions made by Padgett’s trial counsel were strategic and not deficient. Additionally, Padgett failed to show that the outcome of his trial would have been different if his counsel had acted differently. The court concluded that Padgett did not demonstrate prejudice from his counsel’s performance and affirmed the conviction. View "PADGETT v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In January 2013, Stanislav “Steven” Yelizarov robbed a jewelry store after a series of serious events, including home burglaries and kidnapping. He received a thirty-year sentence for kidnapping and conspiracy to commit a Hobbs Act robbery. Over eight years, Yelizarov agreed to two plea deals, filed two motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, was sentenced twice, and had three judges decide parts of his cases. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations and that his sentence was unreasonable.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland initially sentenced Yelizarov to 360 months based on a plea agreement. After learning of a potential murder charge, Yelizarov renegotiated a plea deal, which included a waiver of appeal. He later filed a § 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, arguing his attorney failed to advise him properly about the murder charge and its implications. The district court denied the motion, finding no prejudice from the attorney’s actions, as Yelizarov was aware of the potential murder charge and chose to plead guilty.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, agreeing that Yelizarov was not prejudiced by his counsel’s performance. The court found that Yelizarov knowingly waived his right to appeal his sentence, including claims of procedural and substantive unreasonableness. The court dismissed his appeal regarding the reasonableness of his sentence, enforcing the waiver of appeal in his plea agreement. The court emphasized that a failure to mention specific sentencing factors does not constitute procedural unreasonableness. The decision was affirmed in part and dismissed in part. View "US v. Yelizarov" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiffs, Tsz Keung Wong and Huechi Wong, filed a malicious prosecution action against Yi Dong and his attorneys, alleging that Dong's previous cross-complaint in an earlier lawsuit was filed with malicious intent and lacked probable cause. The Wongs had initially sued Dong over unpaid rent, and Dong responded with a cross-complaint, which he later voluntarily dismissed while an anti-SLAPP motion by the Wongs was pending. The trial court ruled that the Wongs' anti-SLAPP motion would have been granted, entitling them to attorney fees.Dong then filed a motion to strike the Wongs' malicious prosecution action under the anti-SLAPP statute and sought dismissal under Civil Code section 1714.10, which requires pre-filing approval for conspiracy claims against attorneys. The trial court denied both motions, leading Dong to file an interlocutory appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of Dong's anti-SLAPP motion because the Wongs' action qualified as a SLAPPback, which is only reviewable by a peremptory writ petition, not an interlocutory appeal. The court dismissed this portion of Dong's appeal.Regarding the denial of Dong's motion under Civil Code section 1714.10, the court affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the Wongs' malicious prosecution action did not require pre-filing approval because it sought to hold the attorneys independently liable for their own actions, not based on a conspiracy with Dong. The court found that the allegation of conspiracy was surplusage and did not affect the applicability of section 1714.10.In conclusion, the court dismissed Dong's appeal concerning the anti-SLAPP motion and affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion under Civil Code section 1714.10. View "Wong v. Dong" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with first-degree manslaughter after fatally stabbing her boyfriend during a violent altercation. She claimed that she acted in self-defense, citing a history of severe physical abuse by the victim, including multiple incidents of strangulation and a recent sexual assault immediately preceding the stabbing. Several witnesses corroborated the defendant’s account of ongoing abuse, and an order of protection had previously been issued against the victim.The case was tried in Supreme Court, Erie County, where the defendant’s counsel pursued a justification defense under Penal Law § 35.15. During summation, the prosecutor misrepresented the defendant’s testimony by stating that she had never claimed to fear for her life, despite clear testimony to the contrary. The prosecutor also repeatedly accused the defendant of lying, using the term “lies” numerous times. Defense counsel did not object to these remarks. The jury convicted the defendant. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue was unpreserved and that counsel’s failure to object did not constitute ineffective assistance. However, the Appellate Division did grant sentencing relief under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and held that the defendant was denied meaningful representation due to her counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s improper summation remarks. The Court found that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the evidence and repeated personal attacks on the defendant’s credibility exceeded permissible advocacy and undermined the fairness of the trial. The Court concluded that, in the absence of any strategic justification for counsel’s silence, the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. The order of the Appellate Division was reversed, and a new trial was ordered. View "People v T.P." on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the sale of real property. Patricia Ann Scott, the seller, previously sued real estate agent Kaylee Schnelle for professional negligence, alleging mishandling of the sale. Schnelle's motions for summary judgment and directed verdict were denied, and the jury found in her favor. Subsequently, Schnelle filed a malicious prosecution claim against Scott and her attorneys, arguing they lacked probable cause and conspired against her. The defendants moved to dismiss, citing the prior denials as evidence of probable cause.The district court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the previous denials were factors to consider but did not conclusively establish probable cause. The court found Schnelle's allegations sufficient to support her claim. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that the denials did not create a rebuttable presumption of probable cause.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case to determine if such denials should create a rebuttable presumption of probable cause. The court concluded that while the denials are factors in the probable cause analysis, they do not create a rebuttable presumption. The court emphasized the need for a careful, case-by-case analysis rather than a bright-line rule. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the denials of summary judgment and directed verdict motions do not establish probable cause as a matter of law. View "Cantafio v. Schnelle" on Justia Law

Elena Gaston was indicted on charges of trafficking persons for sexual servitude, conspiracy, deriving support from prostitution, and money laundering. The Commonwealth alleged that she ran an escort service where her employees provided sexual services for money. On the day of her trial, a plea agreement was proposed, but during the plea colloquy, Gaston denied key elements of the charges, leading the judge to proceed to trial. During the trial, defense counsel made improper opening statements, conceding Gaston's guilt and inviting the jury to consider irrelevant factors, which led the Commonwealth to move for a mistrial.The trial judge initially opted for a curative instruction instead of a mistrial but later declared a mistrial after concluding that defense counsel's actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The judge noted that defense counsel's failure to consult with Gaston on his opening statement and the detrimental impact of his strategy on her defense warranted a mistrial. Gaston, represented by new counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the indictments on double jeopardy grounds, which the trial judge denied.Gaston then filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from the denial of her motion to dismiss. The petition was denied by a single justice, and she appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the single justice's decision, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declaring a mistrial due to manifest necessity. The court found that the trial judge carefully considered alternatives and provided both parties with opportunities to be heard before declaring a mistrial. The court concluded that defense counsel's conduct was manifestly unreasonable and deprived Gaston of a substantial ground of defense, justifying the mistrial. View "Gaston v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Fourteen plaintiffs, including pilots, a physician, a nurse, and an attorney, were required to undergo alcohol testing to maintain their employment and professional licenses. The tests, developed by United States Drug Testing Laboratories, Inc. (USDTL), indicated positive results for alcohol consumption, leading to significant professional harm. The plaintiffs alleged that the tests were unreliable and sued USDTL and its officers under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state law. They also sued Choice Labs Services (CLS) and its owners, who provided the tests to the administrators.The plaintiffs initially filed suit in the Southern District of Florida, asserting claims for fraud and negligence. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice, finding the complaint insufficient. The plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint, adding CLS as defendants. The case was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois, where the district court dismissed the RICO claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the judgment was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish proximate causation for their RICO claims, as they did not adequately allege a direct link between USDTL's alleged misrepresentations and their professional injuries. The court also found that the plaintiffs did not meet the heightened pleading requirements for fraud under Rule 9(b). Consequently, the RICO claims were dismissed with prejudice, and the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice. View "Ratfield v United States Drug Testing Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law