Justia Professional Malpractice & Ethics Opinion Summaries

After being arrested for violating probation related to a past conviction and facing a new charge for failing to register as a sex offender, the plaintiff was indicted in federal court for possession of a firearm as a prohibited person. Initially represented by the defendant, a federal public defender, the plaintiff entered a guilty plea. Before sentencing, the attorney withdrew due to communication breakdown, and a new counsel was appointed. The plaintiff was ultimately sentenced to prison and supervised release. He later filed a motion in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawful searches, fabricated evidence, and coercion regarding his plea. The federal court rejected these claims, finding no supporting evidence and that the searches and arrest had been lawful.Subsequently, the plaintiff brought a civil action in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, alleging professional negligence by his former attorney based on similar allegations already raised in the federal proceeding. The district court noted the plaintiff’s failure to timely and properly disclose expert witnesses but primarily analyzed whether his claims were barred by collateral estoppel. It found that the issues had already been litigated and decided in the federal court, and thus granted summary judgment for the defendant, dismissing all claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that all four elements of collateral estoppel were satisfied: the issues were identical to those litigated in federal court, there was a final judgment on the merits, the parties were the same, and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims previously. Therefore, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of the claims, holding they were barred by collateral estoppel. View "Benton v. Babcock" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute that arose after a company, Motiva Performance Engineering, failed to deliver on an agreement to upgrade a vehicle for the plaintiff, resulting in a jury verdict against Motiva for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and violation of the Unfair Practices Act. The company’s managing member, who was also its attorney, transferred Motiva’s Ferrari to another company he controlled shortly after the verdict and subsequently used the car as collateral for a loan without disclosing this to the court. Additional questionable conduct included failing to disclose or potentially backdating a promissory note and depositing insurance proceeds into his personal account. These acts occurred while the court was overseeing asset proceedings to satisfy the judgment against Motiva.Following these actions, the district court held a hearing and issued a sanctions order against the managing member and his associated entities for what it termed remedial contempt, requiring payment of the underlying judgment and a $50,000 donation to charity. The sanctions order also referenced Rule 1-011 NMRA (Rule 11) violations due to misstatements in court filings. The managing member moved for reconsideration, arguing the evidence did not support remedial contempt, but appealed the order before the motion was decided. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the sanctions on both inherent powers and Rule 11 grounds, though a dissent questioned the breadth of conduct relied upon under Rule 11.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that the district court erred by imposing punitive contempt sanctions without affording criminal-level due process protections and that such sanctions could not be justified under the court’s inherent powers without those protections. However, the court upheld the sanctions under Rule 11, as the due process requirements for Rule 11 are not equivalent to those for contempt. The holding was limited to willful misstatements made in documents filed with the court. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Butler v. Motiva Performance Engineering, LLC" on Justia Law

A medical device company that manufactures spinal devices was indicted, along with its CEO and CFO, for allegedly paying bribes to surgeons through a sham consulting program in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. The indictment claimed the surgeons did not provide bona fide consulting services, but were paid to use and order the company’s devices in surgeries covered by federal health care programs. The company’s CFO, who is not a shareholder but is one of only two officers, allegedly calculated these payments based on the volume and value of surgeries performed with the company’s devices. During the development of the consulting program, the company retained outside counsel to provide legal opinions on the agreements’ compliance with health care law, and those opinions were distributed to the surgeons.After the grand jury returned the indictment, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts addressed whether the CFO’s plan to argue at trial that the involvement of outside counsel negated his criminal intent would effect an implied waiver of the company’s attorney-client privilege. The district court initially found that if the CFO or CEO invoked an “involvement-of-counsel” defense, it would waive the corporation’s privilege over communications with counsel. Following dismissal of charges against the company, the district court focused on whether the officers collectively could waive the privilege, concluded they could, and ruled that the CFO’s planned defense would constitute an implied waiver, allowing disclosure of certain privileged communications to the government. The district court stayed its order pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the district court’s waiver order and remanded. The Court of Appeals held that (1) the record was insufficient to determine whether the CFO alone had authority to waive the company’s privilege, and (2) not every involvement-of-counsel defense necessitates a waiver. The appellate court directed the district court to reassess the issue in light of changed circumstances and to consider less intrusive remedies before finding an implied waiver. View "United States v. SpineFrontier, Inc." on Justia Law

Donald J. Trump filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against dozens of defendants, including Hillary Clinton, the Democratic National Committee, several law firms, and individuals, alleging that they conspired to spread false claims of his collusion with Russia during the 2016 presidential campaign. Trump asserted multiple claims, including two under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and three under Florida law, such as injurious falsehood and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution. He alleged that these actions caused him substantial financial harm and loss of business opportunities.After extensive pleadings, the district court dismissed Trump’s amended complaint with prejudice, holding that his federal racketeering claims were untimely and legally insufficient, and that his state law claims either failed to state a claim or were also untimely. The court found the complaint to be a “shotgun pleading” and cited numerous factual inaccuracies and implausible legal theories. The court also dismissed claims against certain defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, but did so with prejudice. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on Trump and his attorneys for filing frivolous claims and pleadings, based both on its inherent authority and Rule 11, and denied Trump’s motions for reconsideration and to disqualify the judge.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed most of the district court’s orders. The appellate court held that Trump’s racketeering claims were untimely and meritless, and that his state law claims failed for both procedural and substantive reasons. However, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over one defendant, Orbis, and therefore vacated the dismissal with prejudice as to Orbis, remanding with instructions to dismiss those claims without prejudice. The sanctions orders and other rulings were affirmed, and requests for appellate sanctions were denied. View "Trump v. Clinton" on Justia Law

Lewis Patrick and Michele Sivertson owned and managed Laughing Dog Brewing, Inc. (LDB), which faced financial difficulties in 2017. To address these issues, they, along with affiliated entities AHR, LLC and Fetchingly Good, LLC, engaged attorney Ford Elsaesser to restructure their debt. Elsaesser drafted a promissory note and facilitated the transfer of LDB’s assets to AHR and Fetchingly Good, allegedly without disclosing conflicts of interest or legal risks. After the asset transfer, Fetchingly Good assumed LDB’s operations, and LDB filed for bankruptcy. Acorn Investments, LLC, a creditor with a judgment against LDB, sued the Original Plaintiffs under various theories, including the Idaho Uniform Voidable Transactions Act and racketeering statutes.The litigation between Acorn and the Original Plaintiffs was resolved through a settlement agreement. The Original Plaintiffs stipulated to a judgment in favor of Acorn, but Acorn agreed not to execute on the judgment. Instead, Acorn received an assignment of the Original Plaintiffs’ claims against Elsaesser, including legal malpractice, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. Acorn substituted as plaintiff in the malpractice case. Elsaesser moved for summary judgment, arguing that the malpractice claim was not assignable. The District Court of the First Judicial District, Bonner County, agreed and dismissed the case without prejudice, finding the assignment did not meet the exception for assignability established in St. Luke’s Magic Valley Regional Medical Center v. Luciani.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court held that the assignment of the legal malpractice claim to Acorn did not fall within the Luciani exception, which allows assignment only when such claims are transferred as part of a larger commercial transaction involving other business assets and liabilities. Here, only the claims were assigned, not any business assets or obligations. The Court also declined to award attorney fees to either party, but awarded costs to Elsaesser. View "Acorn Investments, LLC v. Elsaesser" on Justia Law

In this matter, an attorney representing the appellant in a civil case filed a petition for writ of supersedeas and an opening appellate brief that included citations to several cases that do not exist. The cited case names, reporter volumes, and page numbers either led to unrelated cases or to no cases at all, and the legal propositions attributed to these citations were unsupported by any actual authority. The attorney later provided copies of real cases with similar names but different citations, which also failed to support the propositions for which the fabricated citations were used. The attorney claimed these errors were clerical and not the result of intentional fabrication or reliance on artificial intelligence (AI), although he admitted to using AI in preparing at least one of the briefs.The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division Two, issued an order to show cause regarding the fabricated citations and held a hearing. The attorney responded in writing and at the hearing, accepting responsibility for the citation errors but maintaining they were not willful and resulted from a breakdown in his citation-verification process. He asserted that the errors were clerical and not the product of AI hallucinations, although he acknowledged using AI in preparing the appellate brief and possibly the writ. The court found his explanations lacking in credibility, noting that the errors were not consistent with mere clerical mistakes and that the attorney’s claims about his verification process were contradicted by his own admissions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Two, held that the attorney unreasonably violated California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), by failing to support each point in his briefs with citations to real legal authority. The court imposed a sanction of $1,750, to be paid to the court, and directed the clerk to notify the State Bar of California of the sanction. View "Schlichter v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

The case involves a long-running dispute between two parties, Baer and Tedder, stemming from Baer's lawsuit against Tedder for malicious prosecution. During the course of this litigation, Baer filed a motion to compel production of documents and requested sanctions against Tedder and his counsel, Kent, for misuse of the discovery process. The trial court found that Tedder and Kent had engaged in evasive and unjustified conduct during discovery, which hindered Baer's ability to prepare his case. As a result, the court imposed $10,475 in monetary sanctions against both Tedder and Kent, jointly and severally.Tedder and Kent appealed the sanctions order to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three. In a prior opinion, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s sanctions order, finding that Tedder and Kent’s actions were not substantially justified and that their arguments on appeal were largely frivolous. Following the remittitur, Baer moved in the trial court to recover attorney’s fees incurred in defending the appeal, arguing that the relevant discovery statutes authorized such an award. The trial court agreed, awarding Baer $113,532.50 in appellate attorney’s fees, but imposed liability only on Tedder.On further appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030(a) and 2031.320(b) authorize a trial court to award attorney’s fees incurred on appeal to a party who successfully defends an order imposing monetary sanctions for discovery misuse. The appellate court found the amount of fees reasonable with one reduction and concluded that both Tedder and Kent should be held jointly and severally liable for the full amount. The order was modified to reduce the fee award to $101,805 and to impose joint and several liability on both Tedder and Kent, and as modified, the order was affirmed and remanded for entry of the revised order. View "Baer v. Tedder" on Justia Law

A county attorney in Nebraska sought to challenge the appointment of a special prosecutor in a juvenile court case. The issue arose because the county attorney’s adult daughter, who works as a caseworker for the Department of Health and Human Services, was assigned to the same juvenile case and could potentially be called as a witness. The daughter testified that she did not discuss her work with her father and that her father’s position would not affect her testimony. The deputy county attorney assigned to the case also testified to his independence in handling the matter.The Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster County, on its own initiative, raised concerns about a possible conflict of interest due to the familial relationship. The court found that the lack of disclosure of the relationship, combined with the organizational structure of the county attorney’s office, created a conflict of interest. Relying on Nebraska ethics advisory opinions and a prior appellate decision, the court concluded that the entire county attorney’s office should be disqualified and appointed a special prosecutor under Nebraska Revised Statute § 23-1205.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the matter as an original action in quo warranto. The court held that the existence of a conflict of interest must be determined on a case-by-case basis and is personal to the attorney involved. It found no evidence that the county attorney’s professional judgment or the deputy county attorney’s independence was compromised by the daughter’s involvement. The court concluded that the appointment of a special prosecutor was unwarranted under the facts presented and ordered the ouster of the special prosecutor, reinstating the county attorney’s office to the case. View "State ex rel. Condon v. Braaten" on Justia Law

A law firm sought defense and indemnification from its professional liability insurer after being sued in New York state court by a judgment creditor of its client. The creditor alleged that the firm facilitated the sale of the client’s diamond ring and received a portion of the proceeds to satisfy past fees and as a retainer for future services, despite a restraining notice prohibiting the client from transferring assets due to an unpaid judgment. The state court complaint accused the firm of fraudulent conveyance, tortious interference with judgment collection, and contempt of court.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed the law firm’s claims for defense and indemnification and denied its motion for partial summary judgment regarding the insurer’s duty to defend. The district court found that the policy’s misappropriation exclusion applied, concluding that the firm’s handling of the sale proceeds was unauthorized in light of the restraining notice, regardless of the client’s consent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. Applying New York law, the Second Circuit held that the allegations in the underlying complaint involved the provision of professional services by the law firm and did not constitute “misappropriation” as commonly understood, since there was no allegation that the firm acted without its client’s authorization. The court found the term “misappropriation” ambiguous and construed it in favor of the insured. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal, reversed the denial of partial summary judgment on the duty to defend, and remanded with instructions to enter partial summary judgment for the law firm on the insurer’s duty to defend. The court did not address other policy exclusions or the insurer’s ultimate duty to indemnify. View "Marcus & Cinelli, LLP v. Aspen Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Centripetal Networks LLC owns a patent related to rule-based network threat detection for encrypted communications. In November 2021, Palo Alto Networks petitioned for inter partes review (IPR) of certain claims of Centripetal’s patent. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) instituted the IPR with a panel of three administrative patent judges (APJs). Subsequently, Cisco Systems and Keysight Technologies filed similar petitions and sought to join the proceedings. During the process, Centripetal discovered that one APJ, McNamara, owned Cisco stock and moved for the recusal of the panel and vacatur of the institution decision, arguing a conflict of interest. After rehearing requests and additional disclosures, APJ McNamara and another APJ withdrew from the panel, but the Board denied Centripetal’s recusal motion as untimely and found no violation of ethics rules or due process.The PTAB, in its final written decision, held claims 1, 24, and 25 of Centripetal’s patent unpatentable as obvious. Centripetal appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, challenging both the merits of the Board’s obviousness determination and the handling of the recusal issue. The Federal Circuit reviewed the Board’s recusal analysis for abuse of discretion and its legal conclusions de novo, finding that Centripetal’s recusal motion was untimely and that the APJ’s stock ownership did not violate applicable ethics regulations. The court also determined that Centripetal’s due process rights were not infringed and that the Board’s actions did not warrant vacatur based on recusal concerns.However, the Federal Circuit found that the PTAB failed to adequately consider evidence of copying presented by Centripetal as part of the obviousness analysis. The court vacated the Board’s final written decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Board to properly address the evidence of copying. The disposition by the Federal Circuit was “vacated and remanded.” View "CENTRIPETAL NETWORKS, LLC v. PALO ALTO NETWORKS, INC. " on Justia Law